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THE CONSTITUTIONALITY OF DECLARATORY
JUDGMENTS
It is not uncommon in the United States for opponents of statutory
reform, or even defendants against unwelcome suits, to advance the ob-
jection of unconstitutionality. Declaratory judgment statutes have not
escaped this custom. Although it will strike an informed student as
strange that the procedure for the rendering of declaratory judgments
should be attacked as unconstitutional, the fact is that the issue has
been raised in a number of American cases, though never in any other
country. The special ground asserted has been that the declaratory
judgment imposes on the courts powers non-judicial in character and
that it requires them to decide cases that are moot or to render advisory
opinions, or, in some instances, even, that judgments that carry no exe-
cution are unconstitutional. Fourteen state courts have considered these
arguments and have unanimously concluded that they are unsound, be-
cause they proceed from a misconception as to the nature of a declar-
atory judgment. After some earlier hesitation, the United States
Supreme Court has now held that a decree of execution is no essential
part of a valid and final judgment.1 The fact that the highest courts
in fourteen states have expressly held, after one early misstep in
Michigan,2 that the declaratory judgment is in every respect constitu-
tional,3 and that the courts of twelve other states have assumed its con-
stitutionality, 4 would ordinarily relieve a commentator from spending
much time or space on the question of constitutionality. 5
1 Fidelity National Bank & Trust Co. v. Swope, 274 U. S. 123, 47 Sup. Ct. 511
(1927) ; Old Colony Trust Co. v. Commissioner of Internal Revenue, 279 U. S.
716, 49 Sup. Ct. 499 (1929).
'Anway v. Grand Rapids Railway Co., 211 Mich. 592, 179 N. W. 350 (1920).
'Arizona: Morton v. Pacific Constr. Co., 283 Pac. 281 (Ariz. 1929) ; Cali-
fornti: Blakeslee v. Wilson, 190 Cal. 479, 213 Pac. 495 (1923); Connecticut:
Braman v. Babcock, 98 Conn. 549, 120 Atl. 150, 152 (1923) ; Florida: Sheldon v.
Powell, 99 Fla. 782, 128 So. 258 (1930); Indiana: Zoercher v. Agler, 172 N. E.
186 (Ind. 1930) ; Kansas: State ex rel. Hopkins v. Grove, 109 Kan. 619, 201 Pac.
82 (1922) ; Kenttwky: Black v. Elkhorn Coal Corp., 233 Ky. 588, 26 S. W. (2d)
481 (1930) ; Michigan: Washington-Detroit Theater Co. v. Moore, 249 Mich. 673,
229 N. W. 618 (1930); New Jersey: McCrory Stores Corp. v. S. M. Braunstein,
Inc., 102 N. J. L. 590, 134 Atl. 752 (1926) ; New York: Board of Education v.
Van Zandt, 119 Misc. 124, 195 N. Y. Supp. 297 (Sup. Ct. 1922), aff'd, 234 N. Y.
644, 138 N. E. 481 (1923) ; Pennsylvania: In re Kariher's Petition, 284 Pa. 455,
131 Atl. 265 (1925) ; Tennessee: Miller v. Miller, 149 Tenn. 463, 261 S. W. 965
(1924); Virginia: Patterson's Ex'rs v. Patterson, 144 Va. 113, 131 S. E. 217
1926); Wisconsin: City of Milwaukee v. Chicago & N. W. Ry., 230 N. W. 626
(Wis. 1930).
'Colorado, Hawaii (ter.), Massachusetts, Nebraska, Nevada, North Dakota,
Oregon, Rhode Island, South Carolina, South Dakota, Utah, and Wyoming.
' See the statement of Rodenbeck, J, in Board of Education v. Van Zandt,
mipra note 3, 119 Misc. at 127, 195 N. Y. Supp. at 300: "The constitutionality of
such a proceeding as this one for a declaratory judgment, where an actual con-
troversy exists involving only a question of law, and the power of the Supreme
Court to authorize such a procedure in such a case is not open to question."
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COLUMBIA LAW REVIEW
Unfortunately, however, the matter cannot be so lightly dismissed,
because no less an authority than the United States Supreme Court, al-
though never having had occasion to apply or construe a declaratory
judgment act, has undertaken in several dicta to express the opinion that
the declaratory judgment is unconstitutional, because it is not a judg-
ment in "cases" or "controversies," to which the federal judicial power
is confined.6 In so concluding, the court has fallen into the same line
of reasoning which distinguished the now overruled opinion of the
Michigan Supreme Court in the Anway case,7 namely, that an action
for a declaratory judgment required or implied or permitted the deci-
sion of a moot case or the rendering of an advisory opinion-functions
which, it is admitted, are not judicial, because not deciding "cases" or
"controversies." For this reason, and because this attitude of the United
States Supreme Court has blocked the final enactment of a statute by
Congress authorizing the federal courts to render dedlaratory judgments,
it is necessary to examine the history of the question of constitutionality
as it has been presented in the record of American cases.
State Caurts
Aside from the little used and narrow statutes granting a limited
power of rendering declaratory judgments in Rhode Island (1876),
Maryland (1888), Connecticut (1893, 1915), and New Jersey (1915),
the first broad statute in this country was enacted in Michigan in 1919.8
It provided that:
'Liberty Warehouse Co. v. Grannis, 273 U. S. 70, 47 Sup. Ct. 282 (1927);
Liberty Warehouse Co. v. Burley Tobacco Growers' Co-op. Marketing Ass'n, 276
U. S. 71, 89, 48 Sup. Ct. 291, 294 (1928) ; Willing v. Chicago Auditorium Ass'n,
277 U. S. 274, 48 Sup. Ct. 507 (1928).
'Supra note 2.
' Public Acts 1919, Act 150. The proposed federal Act provides:
"AN ACT To amend the Judicial Code by adding a new section, to be num-
bered 274D.
"Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of the United
States of America in Congress assembled, That the Judicial Code approved March
3, 1911, is hereby amended by adding after section 274C thereof a new section to be
numbered 274D, as follows:
'Sec. 274D. (1) In cases of actual controversy in which the courts of the
United States would have jurisdiction, the said courts upon petition shall havejurisdiction to declare rights and other legal relations on request of any interested
party for such declarations whether or not further relief is or could be prayed, and
such declarations shall have the force of a final judgment and be reviewable as
such.
'(2) Further relief based on a declaratory judgment or decree may be granted
whenever necessary or proper. The application shall be by petition to a court
having jurisdiction to grant the relief. If the application be deemed sufficient, the
court shall, on reasonable notice, require any adverse party, whose rights have been
adjudicated by the declaration, to show cause why further relief should not be
granted forthwith.
'(3) When a declaration of right or the granting of further relief based
thereon shall involve the determination of issues of fact triable by a jury, such is-
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CONSTITUTIONALITY OF JUDGMENTS
"No action or proceeding in any court of record shall be open to objec-
tion on the ground that a merely declaratory judgment, decree or order is
sought thereby, and the court may make binding declarations of rights
whether any consequential relief is or could be claimed, or not."
As so often happens in the United States, the facts of the first case
which draws into issue the constitutionality of a statute are likely to
have vital influence upon the views of the court. Those familiar with
the declaratory judgment in England would not have found the Anway
case difficult; but to a court that had never heard of it, the case may have
seemed novel and unusual, not because its facts would not have pre-
sented a justiciable issue, but because the parties to the record had no
adverse interests. The adverse parties were intervenors and others out-
side the court." The statute of Michigan forbade street railway com-
panies to "require" motormen and conductors to work more than six
days per week, except in certain emergencies. The plaintiff was a non-
union conductor employed by the company and wished to work more
than six days a week. He therefore brought an action against the
company as defendant for a declaration or determination that he was
privileged to work more than six days if both he and the company were
willing. A labor union of street railway employees intervened and
contended that the statute should be construed to prevent the plaintiff
from working more than six days a week. They, with the state or the
attorney-general, had the adverse interest. From a decision in favor
of the plaintiff, the intervening union appealed to the supreme court.
That court invited the attorney-general, Professor Sunderland, and
others to file briefs on the constitutionality of the declaratory judgment
statute. The majority of the court, by Fellows, J., held that the statute
imposed on the court "non-judicial" fiinctions. The minority, by Sharpe,
sues may be submitted to a jury in the form of interrogatories, with proper in-
structions by the court, whether a general verdict be required or not.
'(4) The Supreme Court may adopt rules and regulations for carrying out the
provisions of this section.'"
'An almost identical situation was presented to the United States Supreme
Court and deemed a justiciable issue under customary procedure in Kentucky v.
Indiana, 281 U. S. 163, 50 Sup. Ct. 275 (1930). In that case, Kentucky and In-
diana had entered into a contract for the construction of a bridge across the Ohio
River. Certain taxpayers in Indiana had brought a suit to restrain Indiana from
performing the contract, as unauthorized by Indiana law. Indiana wished to per-
form, believed it was entitled to perform, and stated it was ready to perform, but
by the suit was placed in doubt. Thereupon Kentucky sued Indiana in the Supreme
Court for specific performance, joining the Indiana taxpayers. The taxpayers,
the only parties taking a position adverse to the plaintiff, were dismissed as having
insufficient interest. Both Kentucky and Indiana wanted the same judgment,
namely, that the contract was valid and performable; they were in no sense ad-
verse parties. Indiana's pleadings admitted the correctness of Kentucky's allega-
tions. The Supreme Court issued the decree sought, without raising the question
that the only legitimate parties to the record had no adverse interests.
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J., held otherwise, but concluded that the declaration should not have
been granted in the instant case.
As already observed, there was no issue between the plaintiff and
the defendant. The issue lay between these parties on the one hand, and
the state or the attorney-general (and the labor union) on the other, for
the plaintiff claimed that he and the defendant were privileged to enter
into a contract for a seven-day working week; the party in interest op-
posed to this contention was not the defendant railway, but the labor
union and the state, which by its statute impliedly threatened prosecu-
tion of parties to such a contract. Unless the state were joined, a judg-
ment in favor of the plaintiff and against the defendant would obviously
have had no binding force upon the state or the attorney-general in a
suit for prosecution. When, therefore, the court says that the plaintiff
has no contract with the defendant, claims no breach of any contract,
does not allege that the defendant has committed or threatened to com-
mit any wrong upon him, or that he has any claim, present or pros-
pective, for any damages from the defendant, it states grounds why, in
the absence of additional parties, a declaratory judgment might con-
ceivably have been refused in that case-though by no means necessarily
so-but no ground supporting the unconstitutionality of a declaratory
judgment in all cases.
It therefore becomes necessary to examine the grounds upon which
the court reached its conclusion that the power given it to render declar-
atory judgments was non-judicial. The first ground is that the tradi-
tional constitutional separation of powers of government confines the
functions of the court to those judicial in character, and that the duty of
giving "advisory opinions" is not judicial.
Relying on the unfortunate form in which the plaintiff framed his
prayer for a declaration "as to whether the said defendant (railway com-
pany) may lawfully permit plaintiff and its other employees who so de-
sire to work more than six days in any one week," and upon the title
of an article, "The courts as authorized legal advisers of the people,"
the court says, "It at once becomes apparent that by the act the courts
of this state are made the legal advisers of all seeking such advice," and
concludes that this duty is "non-judicial." In a slightly hysterical out-
burst the court adds that the belief "that it is the duty of the state
through its courts to furnish advice to its citizens" adopts the view that
"the state is everything, the individual nothing. Under our government
the state does not till our farms, manufacture our automobiles, conduct our
great department stores, or do our law business for us. The unfortunate
people of one country are at present trying such experiment in government."
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These extracts may indicate the prejudice which the declaratory
judgment aroused among the majority members of the court. That
the decision in the Anway case rested upon a major premise or as-
sumption that the Act required or even permitted the court to render
advisory opinions or decide moot cases is apparent. Why such an as-
sumption should have been indulged, has never been explained. In
the light of that error, the court failed adequately to ,analyze and dis-
tinguish from the declaratory judgment such federal cases as Gordon v.
United States,'0 in which the court's judgment would not have been
final, Muskrat v. United States,"l in which there were no adverse parties
or a res before the court, and others again to be referred to in the dis-
cussion of Liberty Warehouse Co. v. Grannis12 in the United States
Supreme Court. Suffice it to say that Justice Sharpe, for the minority
of the Michigan court, pointed out the majority's error; and inasmuch
as the minority opinion has now been strikingly vindicated by the Mich-
igan Supreme Court in its recent decision in Washington-Detroit Thea-
ter Co. v. Moore,'3 in effect overruling the Anway case, it may be not
inappropriate to quote from justice Sharpe's opinion the following
paragraph:
"Herein lies the distinction between declaratory judgments and moot
cases or advisory opinions. The declaratory judgment is a final one, forever
binding on the parties on the issues presented; the decision of a moot
case is mere dictum, as no rights are affected thereby; while an ad-
visory opinion is but an expression of the law as applied to certain facts not
necessarily in dispute and can have no binding effect on any future litiga-
tion between interested persons."
The comments which the Anway decision aroused-all of them
unfavorable to the opinion of the majority'--may have influenced
"See the unofficial opinion of Taney, C. J., 117 U. S. 697 (1864, printed
1885? ; the case is officially reported, without opinion, in 69 U. S. 561 (1864).
219 U. S. 346, 31 Sup. Ct. 250 (1911).
"Supra note 6.
249 Mich. 673, 229 N. W. 618 (1930); see annotation (1930) 68 A. L. R.
105. It should be added that the court in this decision relies upon an Amendment
to the 1919 Michigan statute expressly providing that the Act applies only to
"cases of actual controversies" (sic) and an additional paragraph reading, "De-
clarations of right made under this Act shall have the effect of final judgments."
It is submitted that the original Act of 1919 necessarily contained the implication
of both these Amendments, as other courts, for example, those of Connecticut,
Florida, New Jersey, New York, and Pennsylvania, have held. See cases supra
note 3.
" The Michigan decision in the Anway case received the condemnation of
practically all the commentators who discussed it: Dodd, Michigan Declaratory
Judgment Decision (1920) 6 A. B. A. J. 145; O'Donnell, Michqan Declaratory
Judgment Decisionr (1921) 7 A. B. A. J. 141; Note (1921) 21 COLUMBIA LAw REv.
168; Note (1922) 7 CoRN. L. Q. 255; Note (1922) 4 ILL. L. Q. 126; Note (1920)
19 MicHr. L. REv. 86; Schoonmaker, Declaratory Judgments (1921) 5 MINN. L.
REv. 172; Rice, The Constitutionality of the Declaratory Judgment' (1921) 28
W. VA. L. Q. 1; Note (1920) 30 YALE L. J. 161.
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other courts to avoid similar errors. A re-examination of the scope of
the function known as "judicial power" was doubtless useful. Needless
to say, all the state courts which have since had occasion to pass upon a
declaratory judgment statute and all the comments upon the subject
have concluded that an action for a declaratory judgment, like any other
action between adversary parties involving contested issues and a res
or right which is conclusively affected, presents a case or controversy
or suit whose determination is of the very essence of judicial power.
Perhaps the thousands of such judgments rendered in the past half cen-
tury in nearly every English-speaking jurisdiction and on the continent
of Europe should have carried some assurance of that fact.
To avoid any possibility of a misconception of the function to be
performed by a declaratory judgment, the Kansas and California stat-
utes of 1921, and the Virginia and Kentucky statutes of 1922, with the
Anway decision presumably in mind, were supplied with the clause "in
cases of actual controversy," and in Kansas and Virginia, with the
further clause, "actual antagonistic assertion and denial of right."'u
That these words are unnecessary is evidenced by the fact that the
statutes not containing these words have been held constitutional in other
states, on the assumption, inescapable in fact, that only such cases could
be appropriately presented for declaratory judgment.' The danger in
the words "actual controversy" lies in the fact that courts hostile to
this procedural reform may attempt to suggest that a controversy con-
cerning legal rights arising before physical damage is done or a pur-
ported right exercised, is not "actual." Were the controversy not
genuine or ripe for judicial decision, with a plaintiff and defendant
having actually or potentially opposing interests, with a res or other legal
interest definitely affected by the judgment rendered and the judgment a
final determination of the issue, it would fail to present a justiciable
dispute-not because it seeks a declaratory judgment, but because it
lacks the elements essential to invoke a judgment from judicial courts.
The first case following that of Anway v. Grand Rapids Railway,
in which the constitutionality of the declaratory judgment was raised,
was the Kansas case of State ex rel. Hopkins v. Grove.17 In that case,
Groye, an employee of the Missouri Pacific Railroad Co., had been
elected to the office of City Commissioner of Wichita. A Kansas statute
' Kansas: Laws 1921, c. 168, § 1; KAN. REv. STAT. ANN. (1923) §§ 60-3127.
California: Stat. 1921, c. 463, p. 689; CAL. CODES OF CIv. PRoc. (Deering, 1923)§ 1060. Virginia: Acts 1922, p. 902; VA. CODE ANN. (1930) § 6140a. Kentutcky:
Acts 1922, c. 83, §§ 1, 2; KENTUCKY CODES (Carroll, 1927) §§ 639a-1, 2.
"Braman v. Babcock, 98 Conn. 549, 120 At. 150 (1923) ; In rc Kariher's Pe-
tition, 284 Pa. 455, 131 At. 265 (1925) ; Miller v. Miller, 149 Tenn. 463, 261 S. W.
965 (1924).
109 Kan. 619, 201 Pac. 82 (1922).
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forbade under penalty an employee of a railroad operating under a fran-
6hise from or having a contract with a city, from holding office in that
city. Before Grove took office, the attorney-general of the state
brought an action against him for a declaratory judgment that Grove
was ineligible to the office of City Commissioner, because the railroad
held a franchise from the city; and after hearings the court so held.
Instead of taking office first and incurring a criminal penalty, the ques-
tion was appropriately tested by a preliminary preventive action. The
issue might possibly have been presented, certainly after taking of-
fice, by a regular proceeding in quo warranto, by an injunction, or by a
criminal prosecution; all these were rendered unnecessary, however, by
the action for a "binding adjudication," and the court expressly holds
that an injunction becomes unnecessary when a conclusive judgment
establishes the rights of the parties.' 8 The Kansas Supreme Court, re-
lying ostensibly upon the difference between the Kansas and the Michi-
gan statutes in the employment by Kansas of the phrase "cases of
actual controversy," but actually disapproving of the reasoning of the
majority in the Anway case, comes to the conclusion that there is noth-
ing unusual about the declaratory judgment except the fact that it
carries no execution and that it does not require (although it admits of)
the "actual ccmmission of a wrong" before action may be brought. 19
The Kansas court also points out that the federal cases upon which
the Michigan court relied in the Anway case merely discountenance the
giving of judgments not final or the decision of moot cases or the render-
ing of advisory opinions, phenomena which have nothing to do with the
declaratory judgment. Indeed, the court points out that the federal
Supreme Court has rendered declaratory judgments without so denomi-
" In the fact that Kansas substituted for "declaration of right" the term "ad-judications of right," as Massachusetts substitutes "determinations," it becomes
apparent that the term "declaration" or "declaratory judgment" is the equivalent of
decision, holding, determination, finding, ruling, judgment, or adjudication.
10109 Kan. at 622, 201 Pac. at 84: "Actions to quiet title and to construe wills
are recognized methods of invoking judicial action which do not originate in the
actual commission of a wrong nor terminate in a judgment inflicting a penalty,
granting compensation or injunction, or otherwise giving 'consequental relief'; the
declaration of rights being all that is necessary to fit the requirements of the case.
The decree in an action to quiet title is sometimes so drawn as to order the setting
aside or cancellation of a deed. A declaration that the instrument is void and
without effect amounts to the same thing. The judgment does not change the con-
dition of the title, but simply declares where it is vested. It gives the only relief
that is necessary to settle the controversy-the determination of the ownership of
the property. Why the Legislature cannot authorize similar procedure in like
situations to meet like needs is not apparent. It is hardly conceivable that any
fundamental principle of our government, beyond legislative control, prevents two
disputants, each of whom sincerely believes in the rightfulness of his own claim,
but each of whom wishes to abide by the law, whatever it may be determined to
be, from obtaining an adjudication of their controversy in the courts without one or
the other first doing something that is illegal (in the case of the present defendant
criminal) if he is mistaken in his view of the law."
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nating them. 20 They conclude that the action for an "adjudication" in
the Grove case was a useful and speedy method of preventing unneces-
sary complicaations by avoiding the necessity of Grove's assuming office
and incurring a criminal penalty.
The Kansas decision in the Grove case became the beacon for all
subsequent state cases dealing with the constitutionality of the declar-
atory judgment.21 The Supreme Court of California in 1923 in Blakes-
lee v. Wilson,22 reversing a lower court which bad held the California
act 23 unconstitutional, relied upon the Grove case and upon earlier de-
cisions of the California courts to hold the Act constitutional. The
Blakeslee case involved the interpretation of a disputed contract for the
employment on a contingency basis of Blakeslee, a lawyer, to conduct
certain patent litigation for Wilson. Wilson declined to pay the con-
tingent fee, maintaining that the contract of employment had been
changed. to a new basis. Although Blakeslee could have sued for his
contingent fee, he preferred to sue for the milder declaratory judgment
that he was entitled to the fee. In overruling a demurrer to the com-
' This topic will receive more detailed mention in a subsequent portion of this
paper.
It is not conclusive that the Kansas court relied upon State v. Allen, 107 Kan.
407, 191 Pac. 476 (1920), in which the correctness of an instruction in a criminal
appeal was passed upon, though the jury had disagreed and been discharged. The
Supreme Court of the United States and of Arizona [United States v. Evans, 213
U. S. 297, 29 Sup. Ct. 507 (1909); State v. Miller, 14 Ariz. 440, 130 Pac. 891
(1913)] have held such appeals moot and, therefore, beyond judicial power. In
Arkansas, Indiana, Iowa, Kentucky, Ohio, and Oklahoma, as well as Kansas,
statutes permitting such appeals have been sustained. They are objectionable, be-
cause they do not concretely affect legal interests presently at stake.
' See e.g., Board of Education v. Van Zandt, supra note 3, citing Report,
Board of Statutory Consolidation, 1915, v. I, § 57, n. 54.
'190 Cal. 479, 213 Pac. 495 (1923).
' Section 1060. "Any person interested under a deed, will or other written in-
strument, or under a contract, or who desires a declaration of his rights or duties
with respect to another, or in respect to, in, over or upon property, or with respect
to the location of the natural channel of a watercourse, may, in cases of actual
controversy relating to the legal rights and duties of the respective parties, bring
an action in the superior court for a declaration of his rights and duties in the
premises, including a determination of any question of construction or validity
arising under such instrument or contract. He may ask for a declaration of rights
or duties, either alone or with other relief; and the court may make a binding
declaration of such rights or duties, whether or not further relief is or could be
claimed at the time. The declaration may be either affirmative or negative in
form and effect, and such declaration shall have the force of a final judgment.
Such declaration may be had before there has been any breach of the obligation
in respect to which said declaration is sought."
Section 1061. "The court may refuse to exercise the power granted by this
chapter in any case where its declaration or determination is not necessary or
proper at the time under all the circumstances."
Section 1062. "The remedies provided by this chapter are cumulative, and shall
not be construed as restricting any remedy, provisional or otherwise, provided by
law for the benefit of any party to such action, and no judgment under this
chapter shall preclude any party from obtaining additional relief based upon the
same facts." Stats. 1921, c. 463, p. 689; CAL. CODES OF CIV. PROC. (Deering,
1923).
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plaint, the Supreme Court holds that the Act empowering the court to
render declaratory judgments did not impose non-judicial duties on the
court, and that the Act necessarily can only be invoked, as the California
statute specifically prescribes, "in cases of actual controversy," and that
under such circumstances the court's judgment is necessarily a con-
clusive determination of issues between adversary parties. In declin-
ing to follow the reasoning of the Anwy case, the California court,
like the Kansas court in the Grove case, calls attention to the difference
between the Michigan and the California statutes, and to the fact that
the California courts had overruled similar objections in two previous
cases-one involving an act to provide for the establishment and quiet-
ing of title in case of loss or destruction of public records, 24 the other
an act establishing a Torrens system for the certification of land titles
and the simplification of transfers of real estate.2 5 The court emphati-
cally denies that the Act requires or empowers the court to decide most
cases or render advisory opinions.
Connecticut was the next state to deal with the question of con-
stitutionality. In Braman v. Babcock,20 Albert R. Braman brought
an action against the executrix of a decedent's estate for a declaratory
judgment that he was the devisee, designated as ". . . Braman" in the
decedent's will, of certain real estate situated in Rhode Island. This
involved a question of fact which the court considered itself empowered
to decide; but they declined to render the judgment in the exercise
of their discretion, on the ground that, inasmuch as the property was
in Rhode Island, they were not in a position "to settle finally the dis-
pute. or uncertainty." In rejecting the argument that the power to
render declaratory judgments involved the exercise of non-judicial
powers, the court says:
"Could it be claimed with any pretense of reason that the function
was legislative or executive? The answer is obvious. We must then con-
clude that the function is judicial or that it falls outside the three func-
tions described as legislative, executive, or judicial. It would be a travesty
to hold that this method of remedial justice could find no place in our system
of Government unless a place was made for it by an Amendment to the
Constitution."'n
'Title and Document Restoration Co. v. Kerrigan, 150 Cal. 289, 318, 88 Pac.
356 (1906).
'Robinson v. Kerrigan, 151 Cal. 40, 47, 48, 90 Pac. 129 (1907). The court
also refers to the articles of Professor Maurice Harrison, The Declaratory Judg-
vzent in California (1920) 8 CALIF. L. RFv. 133; California Legislation in 1921
Providing Declaratory Relief (1921) 9 CALrF. L. REv. 359.
98 Conn. 549, 120 Atl. 150 (1923).
98 Conn. at 556, 120 Atl. at 152. This statement was approved in Washing-
ton-Detroit Theater Co. v. Moore, supra note 13.
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The court points out that the Rules adopted to carry the Act of 192128
into effect29 require that the plaintiff have "an interest, legal or
equitable, by reason of danger of loss or of uncertainty as to his
rights," that there be "an actual bona fide and substantial question or
issue in dispute or substantial uncertainty of legal relations which
requires settlement between the parties," that all interested persons be
made parties, and that the decision of the court be a final judgment.
The court points out that the claim set up by the defendant "may be ad-
verse, although no attempt has been made to enforce it," and that
"to set it up . . . is treated as of itself a sufficient injury to justify
suit." This shows insight. The court points out that it has hereto-
fore rendered declaratory judgments within limited fields in actions
to quiet title to property under statutes permitting adverse claimants
to interests in property, real or personal, to try the title or interest
in an action leading to a conclusive judgment not requiring execution."'
They consider the Declaratory judgments Act merely to extend the
same judicial power to other classes of rights, the action for a declara-
tory judgment constituting merely a form of judicial procedure; and
they sustain the power of the legislature to "enlarge our methods of
remedial justice by authorizing our courts to protect rights by the
rendering of declaratory judgments." To consider the method uncon-
stitutional, they remark, would be "to close the door to the use in this
state of a method of judicial procedure which for more than a half
century has been used to the great benefit" of the English people. They
add,
"To hold that the judicial power in this state is confined to the consideration
of cases where consequential relief only is sought would be enforcing a
limitation upon the judicial power in accord with custom rather than with
reason and logic."
The "custom," however, is not without exception, for courts in the
Anglo-American world have in many types of cases long rendered
judgments which carry no coercive relief, and which hence are nothing
Section 1. "The superior court shall have power in any action or proceeding
to declare rights and other legal relations on request for such declaration whether
or not further relief is or could be claimed, and such declaration shall have the
force of a final judgment."
Section 2. "The judges of the superior court shall make such orders and rules
as they may deem necessary and proper to carry into effect the provisions of this
act." (Public Acts of 1921, c. 258.)
' Practice Act 1922, at 255. The Connecticut Rules present a sound outline of
the law of declaratory judgments and should dissipate any doubt as to the strictlyjudicial character of such a judgment.
' Miles v. Strong, 68 Conn. 273, 36 AtI. 55 (1896); Dawson v. Orange, 78
Conn. 96, 61 AtI. 101 (1905).
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but declaratory of existing rights. Unfortunately the Connecticut
court, in disapproving the Anway decision and approving the Grove
decision, felt called upon to make a remark about the federal Muskrat
case by suggesting that the Connecticut constitution does not limit
the judicial power to "cases and controversies" .(sic) as does the federal
Constitution 3 1-a concession unnecessary and irrelevant, it is submitted,
because the Muskrat casewould have been a moot case in Connecticut
or in any other state and because the conditions placed by the Connecti-
cut Rules upon the exercise of the power to render declaratory judg-
ments describe a litigated case within the narrowest conceivable con-
struction of the term "cases" or "controversies." Even the United
States Supreme Court has decided many cases in which a breach or
wrong has not been physically perpetrated or coercive relief demanded,
without suggesting that the issue was not a "case" or "controversy." 32
In 1924, the constitutionality of the Uniform Act on declaratory
judgments first came up for consideration in a Tennessee case, Miller
v. Miller.33 The action was brought by a widow against children of
the testator requesting the court to find and declare that under her
husband's will she had the privilege and power, whenever she deemed it
necessary, to sell the real estate and convey a good title. It appears that
she had several times contracted to sell portions of the estate, but on
examining the title the purchasers had declined to take, on the ground
that under the will the children's interest in the property barred the
widow's unqualified privilege of selling. The children denied the
plaintiff's construction of the will, yet the court suggests-and in
this they must not be misunderstood-that there is "no present contro-
versy in the sense of a threatened litigation as to the widow's right
to sell." What is present is a potential claim of the children, now by
the suit and pleadings ripened into an actual claim, impairing the
widow's freedom of sale and constituting in fact a cloud upon her
title. Her action was thus in effect a suit to quiet title, consequent on
her own "doubts" and the "fears" of rejecting purchasers, and to
declare the alleged cloud non-existent; and inasmuch as her claim was
contested, it was in every respect a justiciable issue. The court so
held. In overruling objections of unconstitutionality, the court analyzes
the Anway case and adopts as a sound rule of law Justice Sharpe's
dissenting opinion, emphasizing the fact that "to adjudicate upon and
protect rights and interests of individual citizens and to that end to
" U. S. CONST., art. III, § 2.
' Infra, notes 98 et seq.
' 149 Tenn. 463, 261 S. W. 965 (1924). See comments on this case in Note
(1926) 4 TENN. L. REV. 104; (1925) 3 TEx. L. REV. 483; (1925) 73 U. OF PA. L.
REv. 100; Note (1925) 11 VA. L. REv. 473.
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construe and apply the laws, is a peculiar province of the judicial de-
partment," and that declaratory judgments were not expected to be
rendered except where there is "an actual concrete controversy, a bona
fide contest over asserted existing legal rights." The court adopts, as
the conditions of a declaratory judgment, the criteria laid down in
Scotland and reiterated in numerous cases in England and elsewhere,34
"that the question must be a real and not a theoretical question; that the
person raising it must be able to secure a proper contradicter, that is to
say, some one presently existing who has a true interest to oppose the
declaration sought."
Judge Hall, for the Tennessee court, like a number of other state
judges, apparently somewhat uncertain how to deal with the federal
cases which seem to bear some relation to the subject, makes unneces-
sary concessions to the inhibitory clauses of the federal Constitution
by suggesting, without adequate analysis, that the federal limitations
upon "cases" and "controversies" are not "controlling" in Tennessee.
He might have considered them entirely controlling and yet not have
varied in the least his conclusion in the Miller case.3 1
Perhaps the most exhaustive opinion on the constitutionality of
the declaratory judgment has been that announced by the Pennsyl-
vania Supreme Court in In re Kariher's Petition.36  In that case three
lessors claiming to be absolute owners of certain land negotiated a lease
for quarrying the sub-surface limestone. The proposed lessee de-
clined to take, alleging that one of the lessors had only a life interest
under a certain will and not a fee. The challenged lessor thereupon
brought this action against the lessee and all persons in interest under
the will, demanding a judgment declaring him the owner of a fee.
The necessity of removing this cloud upon his right, much as in the
Miller case, and the fact that the defendants contested his claim, im-
pressed the court not only with the genuineness and actuality of the
controversy, but with the important function that the court subserved
by deciding the disputed issue. The court draws up a considerable
list of cases in which Pennsylvania and other courts have passed upon
disputes with respect to legal rights before a physical injury or pur-
ported invasion has taken place, and without granting coercive relief.
Chief Justice von Moschzisker, for the court, says:
' See Russian Commercial and Industrial Bank v. British Bank for Foreign
Trade, [1921] 2 A. C. 438; In re Kariher's Petition, 284 Pa. 455, 131 Atl. 265
(1925).
'The court points out that the Muskrat case presented no "controversy."
284 Pa. 455, 131 Atl. 265 (1925).
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"No doubt many other instances could be cited where we in Pennsylvania
are today, and have been for many years, indulging in declaratory judg-
ments; the present legislation simply makes that practice more extensive.
When this latter fact is realized, the whole argument as to the act's im-
posing on the courts something new, in the nature of a non-judicial func-
tion, fails; for the statute before us merely presents the extension of a
long and well established judicial function, previously enjoyed to a consid-
erable extent in this state, of declaring the law which governs a given con-
dition of facts so as to make the controvery covered by these facts res
judicata, albeit in many cases no execution may be called for, and even
though the action was started before damages were actually inflicted or be-
fore danger thereof was imminent."
The Pennsylvania court has little compunction in saying that the
Michigan court in the Anway case labored under the erroneous im-
pression that the Act required them to decide moot cases or give ad-
visory opinions, from both of which the declaratory judgment differs
in fundamental respects, and that they were mistaken in the belief that
decisions of the United States Supreme Court in cases where by statute
the court's judgment was made not final or where there was no con-
troversy between adverse parties, required them to hold the Michigan
At unconstitutional. The Pennsylvania court observes that Justice
Day's remark in the Muskrat case,37 that "judicial power .. . is the
right to determine actual controversies arising between adverse litigants,
duly instituted in courts of proper jurisdiction," fully described the
conditions of a declaratory judgment. The procedure had all the Ele-
ments of due process of law, a conclusion reached also by the Con-
necticut and Tennessee courts. The action for a declaratory judgment
was a mere change'or modification in procedure; it offers but "another
method by which a party can call on the courts to adjudicate his rights."
The Pennsylvania court adds, "The legislature has power to change
methods of procedure," and with respect to the power to render de-
claratory judgments, a court will not exercise it unless it is
"satisfied that an actual controversy, or the ripening seeds of one, exists
letween parties, all of whom are sui juris and before the court, and that the
declaration sought will be of practical help in ending the controversy."
Chief Justice von Moschzisker includes another paragraph, in an-
alysis of the scope of the judicial power, which has been quoted by a
number of other courts. He says:
"When adverse litigants are present in court and there is a real con-
troversy between them, a final decision rendered in any form of proceeding
of which the court has jurisdiction is a judgment in the proper sense of that
- 219 U. S. 346, 362, 31 Sup. Ct. 250, 256 (1911).
COLUMBIA LAW REVIEW
term, and the giving of it is a judicial function, whether or not execution
may follow thereon. For instance, the ordinary judgment for defendant is
merely a declaration that, on the evidence offered, the plaintiff has no case;
though, as a matter of fact, it may be entered in an action or proceeding
which was instituted by the plaintiff with the idea, or hope, of securing an
executory judgment; but, like all other declaratory judgments, a judgment
for defendant has the effect of making the issues at stake res judicata,
and, in this important sense, such judgments are forever enforceable-
which, more than the fact that execution may or may not be issued thereon,
gives them the character of judgments."'
In 1926, the Virginia Supreme Court had occasion in Pattersoies
Executors v. Patterson to pass upon the constitutionality of the Virginia
Act of 1922, which followed to some extent the wording of the Kansas
Act considered in the Grove case.39  In the Patterson case, executors
under a will had sold certain property. The children of one of the
heirs later claimed that the executors had mistakenly assumed that they
had such power to sell and challenged the title of the purchasers. There-
upon the executors and the purchasers brought an action against the
.contesting children for a declaration that the power of sale had been
validly exercised, and that the purchasers had received a good title.
In addition to declaratory relief, they prayed that the children be re-
quired to join in the deed of sale. The court held that the executors
actually had no power to sell, but that the children's deceased father
had approved the sale and received the benefits thereof, hence that they
were estopped from contesting its validity. This again was an action
to quiet a title already ostensibly conveyed, a failure to decide which
would have left rights in suspense and uncertainty and made it difficult
to dispose of the property. After calling attention to the previously
discussed conditions of a valid exercise of the judicial power, which
differ in no respect whether directed toward a declaratory or any other
judgment, the court adopts the reasoning of the Grove and other cases
holding a declaratory judgment statute constitutional; and, while dis-
approving the Anway case, holds it not controlling in view of the dif-
ference between the Michigan and Virginia statutes, although they
again point out that there is no warrant for the belief that a declaratory
judgment statute empowers the court to decide moot cases or render
advisory opinions.
In 1926, the New Jersey Court of Errors and Appeals upheld
the constitutionality of the New Jersey Uniform Act of 1924 in Mc-
284 Pa. at 469, 131 Atl. at 270.
144 Va. 113, 131 S. E. 217 (1926). The Virginia Act also includes the
phrases "in cases of actual controversy" and "actual antagonistic assertion and
denial of right."
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Crory Stores Corp. v. S. M. Braunstein, Inc. ° The 1915 New Jersey
Act,4' which, like the Florida Act of 1919 and the Massachusetts Act
of 1929, was confined exclusively to the construction of written in-
struments and the declaration of rights thereunder, had been assumed
to be constitutional. In the McCrory case, a lessee sued his lessor
to have the court declare that a clause in a long-term lease which re-
quired the lessee to pay all increases in taxes "on and after October
27, 1920," gave the lessee immunity from the payment of the excess
of 1920 taxes over those of 1919, and that the obligation began only
with the excess over the 1920 assessment. The lessor contended that
the clause covered increases over the 1919 assessment. In affirming
judgment for the lessee, Chief Justice Gummere, with the concurrence
of thirteen associate justices and judges, held that the Act did not
violate any constitutional requirements in supposedly imposing non-
judicial duties on the court, nor did it infringe upon any of the ele-
ments essential to the proper exercise of judicial power. The court
makes the telling point that the function of construing a contract or
deed is no different froal that of construing a will, and adds that the
reasoning of the courts of Kansas, New York, California, Connecticut,
Tennessee, and Pennsylvania above mentioned is "convincing of the
soundness" of their conclusion that declaratory judgment statutes are
constitutionally unchallengeable. The court goes further, however,
and argues that the "underlying principle" has been upheld in a previous
decision in New Jersey, In re Public Utility Board.42 This was an un-
fortunate analogy, for in that case a statute of 1873 had authorized
the attorney-general to bring a proceeding in the Supreme Court for
the investigation and determination of the question whether a particular
statute had been constitutionally passed and if not, to declare it null
and void. No litigation inter partes was necessary and no res was
necessarily affected by the decision. It was, therefore, much like the
Muskrat case, which presented no justiciable controversy and is no
authority whatever for the action for a declaratory judgment, which
demands litigating parties, a res or right definitely affected, and a final
judgment. It is difficult to believe that the Kansas, Connecticut, Penn-
sylvania, and Tennessee decisions could have been carefully read if
the conclusion can be reached that the proceeding in In re Public Utility
Board is an analogy for the radically different action for a declaratory
judgment. Perhaps this inappropriate analogy accounts for Judge
- 102 N. J. L. 590, 134 At. 752 (1926).
IN. J. Cornp. STAT. (1915) c. 116, § 7; In re Ungaros Will, 88 N. J. Eq. 25,
102 Atl. 244 (1917).4.283 N. J. L. 303, 84 At. 706 (1912).
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Kalisch's lone dissent. But however misconceived the analogy, the
New Jersey court is in full accord with ihe earlier state cases uphold-
ing declaratory judgment statutes.
In 1929 the Arizona Supreme Court sustained the constitutionality
of the Uniform Act in that state.48 In Morton v. Pacific Construction
Co., a paving company had entered into a contract with the city of
Phoenix, Arizona, for the paving of Second Street in that city, the cost
constituting a lien against abutting property. Certain property owners
affected had, in suits against the city and otherwise, challenged the
validity of the company's contract. Thereupon the company brought
this action against certain property owners "to settle and afford relief
from uncertainty and insecurity" with respect to its contract. A de-
murrer on the ground that the action presented no bona fide controversy,
that there was no cause of action, and that there was another action
pending, was overruled, though it was ultimately sustained on the
ground that there were insufficient parties defendant. But on the con-
stitutional propriety of the exercise of judicial power by way of de-
claratory judgment, the court had no doubt. "Ihe Anway case, said the
court, was useful as authority for the proposition that the court will
not render advisory opinions in a case not involving an actual contro-
versy between adversary parties, but not as authority for refusing to
render declaratory judgments. They explained away the federal dicta
by remarking that the federal courts were limited by the terms "cases"
and "controversies," not stopping further to analyze these words or
their application in bona fide controversies seeking declaratory judg-
ments. As will be shown presently, the suggestion that these terms limit
the power to render declaratory judgments in the federal or any other
courts must be founded upon a misconception as to the nature of
declaratory judgments. The Arizona court then relies upon the rea-
soning of the Kariher case in Pennsylvania and the Miller case in
Tennessee to sustain the constitutionality of the Arizona Act. They
suggest that, in the exercise of their discretion, they might not have
rendered a declaratory judgment in the Morton case, because it would
not have terminated the controversy.44
In the recent case of Washington-Detroit Theater Co. v. Moore,45
Morton v. Pacific Constr. Co., 283 Pac. 281 (Ariz. 1929). It is interesting
to note that the Arizona court had earlier refused to render an advisory opinion to
the legislature in a case mistakenly brought for a declaratory judgment. Crawford
v. Favour, 34 Ariz. 13, 267 Pac. 412 (1928).
"This is a common ground for declining, in the exercise of the court's dis-
cretion, to render a declaratory judgment in a particular case. See the cases cited
of Ezzell v. Exall, 207 Ky. 615, 269 S. W. 752 (1925) ; Coke v. Shanks, 209 Ky.
723, 273 S. W. 552 (1925) ; H. C. Heller & Co. v. Hunt-Forbes Constr. Co., 222
Ky. 564, 1 S. W. (2d) 970 (1928).
"249 Mich. 673, 229 N. W. 618 (1930).
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the Michigan Supreme Court, after the repassage in 1929 of the Michi-
gan Act of 1919 with the added phrase "in cases of actual controversies"
(sic) and the specific provision that the declaration of right shall have
the effect of a final judgment, overruled its much criticized majority
decision and opinion in the Anway case and held the amended Michigan
Act constitutional. In so doing, they adopted fully the reasoning of
Justice Sharpe in his dissenting opinion in the Anway case. In the
Washington-Detroit Theater Co. case, a lessee under a 99-year lease
claimed the privilege under the lease to demolish the building on the
leased property and to use a new proposed structure for other than
theater purposes. After discussion of the matter, the lessor defendant
denied the plaintiff's construction of the lease and threatened forfeiture
if plaintiff commenced destruction of the building or used it otherwise
than for a theater. As the present use involved great loss to the lessee, he
brought an action against the lessor for a declaration that he was privi-
leged to demolish the building and use a new one for other than theater
purposes, to which he joined a prayer for an injunction restraining
the lessor from interfering with the destruction of the building or at-
tempting to forfeit the lease. After asserting the view that the new Act
precluded any possibility of the Anway construction, namely, that the
court was empowered to decide "moot cases," render "advisory
opinions," or give "advice," the court remarks:
"When an actual controversy exists between parties, it is submitted
in formal proceedings to a court, the decision of the court is binding upon
the parties and their privies and is res adjudicata of the issue in any other
proceeding in the court in which it may be involved, what else can the de-
cision be but the exercise of judicial power?"
The court then quotes with approval certain paragraphs from the
opinions of the Supreme Courts of Connecticut, Pennsylvania, and
Kansas, set out above, and adds, in answer to the objection that ex-
ecution is part of a judicial judgment:
"In many cases of ordinary actions the mere determination of rights by
judgment or decree ends the controversy. An execution or order of en-
forcement is issued at the instance of a party only where such determina-
tion does not suffice. The court itself does not, of its own motion, enforce
its judgments. The situation is little different as to a declaratory judgment.
Like an ordinary one, it is self-enforcing to the extent of being final and
constituting res adjudicata. Section 3 of the act provides that if further
relief be necessary or proper, it may be had on application of a party.
Whether consequential relief be granted upon the original or a subsequent
petition, and whether an order of enforcement be had of course or on appli-
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cation, go merely to the practice, not to the power of the court. In many
equity proceedings the decree is merely declaratory and enforcement is had
only on subsequent application for an order in contempt or otherwise." 40
In answer to the objection that the federal Supreme Court had held
that "a proceeding for a declaratory judgment is not a 'case' or 'con-
troversy' to which the judicial power of the federal judiciary can at-
tach," the Michigan court points out that the federal court had never
passed on the constitutionality of an Act; that, while the facts of the
Chicago Auditorium case were "substantially identical" with those in the
Washington-Detroit Theater Co. case, there was in the Chicago case
"merely a casual disagreement upon th legal right to tear down the build-
ing instead of definite negotiations to that end and actual controversy
over the right." In actual fact, the Chicago Auditorium case involved
a bitter contest, and no "casual disagreement," as Justice Brandeis per-
haps inadvertently indicated; but if it was an academic difference of
opinion only, then it presented a moot case, which has nothing to do with
the declaratory judgment. After quoting Justice Brandeis' remark that
"no defendant has wronged the plaintiff or has threatened to do so"-a
condition which, if true, prevailed in the Washington-Detroit Theater
case-and that "resort to equity to remove such doubts is a proceeding
which was unknown to either English or American courts at the time
of the adoption of the Constitution, and for more than half a century
thereafter," a conclusion which is hardly sustained by the traditional
equitable bills of quia timet, removing of clouds from title, interpleader,
and other proceedings, the Michigan court seeks, without material war-
rant, to distinguish the federal from the state judicial power, by re-
marking:
"This historical argument, however much it may circumscribe a govern-
ment of granted powers, is not applicable to a sovereign state whose inherent
'The court states certain conditions incidental to the practice of rendering
declaratory judgments taken from 12, 19 and 50 A. L. R. Unfortunately, those
statements are not always accurate, nor are they sustained by all the authorities
cited in A. L. R. For example, a number of the cases cited were not actions for
a declaratory judgment at all. [E.g., Holt v. Custer County, 75 Mont. 328, 243
Pac. 811 (1926); Burton v. Durham Realty & Ins. Co., 188 N. C. 473, 125 S. E. 3(1924); Stinson v. Graham, 286 S. W. 264 (Tex. Civ. App. 1926), which are
cited for the obviously correct proposition that "there must be an actual and bonafide controversy as to which the judgment will be res Juidicata. Such a case re-
quires that all the interested parties shall be before the court."] Nor is it abso-
lutely, though it is generally, true that "a declaration cannot be had in respect of
a cause which, it is merely apprehended or feared, the defendant may assert, where
he has made no claim against the plaintiff thereon, although he refuses to waive any
rights thereunder." Occasionally clouds upon title arise out of documents or rec-
ords or facts which involve no personally asserted claim, though usually it will be
found that a defendant has advanced a claim which endangers or challenges or
questions the plaintiff's rights to an extent warranting judicial protection.
CONSTITUTIONALITY OF JUDGMENTS
powers enable it to attempt the solution of any social problems arising from
current conditions, and which may adventure into experiment for the public
welfare."
This apology or explanation for disregarding the federal cases was
unnecessary; the fact is that the federal dicta were not, it is respectfully
submitted, well considered, made an inadequate investigation of the
subject with which they dealt, and have unnecessarily and without sub-
stantial ground retarded the development of a highly useful procedure.
In 1930, also, the Florida Supreme Court, in Sheldon v. Powell,4 7
upheld the constitutionality of the Florida Act of 1919, which limited
the power to render declaratory judgments to the construction of writ-
ten instruments. In the Sheldon case, an executor had refused to re-
lease a legacy to the trustees of the Young Memorial Library, legatee
under a will, unless they executed a bond for his protection. This, the
trustees of the library refused and brought an action against the exec-
utor for a declaratory judgment that they were entitled to the legacy
without bond. They might have employed another remedy, a legatee's
suit authorized by section 3735 of the Revised General Statutes of 1920;
but the court held that they had the option of pursuing the alternative
remedy by declaratory judgment if they chose.48  The court, not then
knowing that the Michigan court had practically overruled the Anway
case, concluded that the Anway construction of the statute as supposedly
empowering the court to decide "moot cases" and give "advisory opin-
ions," could not be followed. The court further remarks that the dicta
in federal cases, "if approved and adopted by the federal court when
'99 Fla. 782, 128 So. 258 (1930), upholding c. 7857 of Acts of 1919, §§4953-
4954, Compiled Laws of 1927.
,' Citing 9 R. C. L. 957 and 964. The Pennsylvania Supreme Court is quite in
error in assuming that the declaratory judgment can be employed only when no
other "established" remedy is available. In re Cryan's Estate, 152 Ati. 675, 677
(Pa. 1930), and Pennsylvania cases cited. There is no authority in England for
such a view, and it has not been adopted generally in the American states. The
words "whether or not further relief is or could be claimed" mean that a declara-
tory judgment can be prayed for, whether or not damages, an injunction, specific
performance, mandamus, or any other coercive relief could have been or is asked.
That is, a plaintiff may pray (1) for a declaratory judgment alone, though he
might have asked for an injunction or specific performance; or (2) he may pray
for a declaratory judgment in combination with a prayer for an injunction. It does.
not mean merely, as the Pennsylvania Supreme Court suggests, that "such (de-
claratory) relief may be had even though, for full relief, other and additional legal
remedies must be resorted to after the issues in the declaratory judgment proceed-
ings have been determined" (italics supplied), if by that the court means that a de-
claration, plus coercive relief, cannot be asked in one action. If the court means
that a declaration may be asked, even though, for full relief, an injunction or de-
cree of specific performance or damages must later be sought, then it does admit
that a declaration may be obtained, notwithstanding the present possibility of a
suit for an injunction, specific performance, or damages; and in that event, it
contradicts its own generalization that a declaratory judgment "could not properly
be given where another established remedy was available."
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squarely presented," are not binding on the Florida courts, because no
such words as "cases" or "controversies" are to be found in the Florida
constitution. In calling attention to the many state cases in which de-
claratory judgment statutes had been held constitutional, the court re-
marks that "the federal case of Fidelity National Bank & Trust Co. of
Kansas City v. Swop.e49 . ..and cases there cited, may be construed as
upholding the principle as announced by the foregoing state courts."
5 0
The court thus concludes, correctly, it is submitted, that the United
States Supreme Court itself, in spite of its dicta, has in practice been
rendering declaratory judgments right along. After calling attention
to the many types of cases in which Anglo-American courts have tradi-
tionally rendered declaratory judgments before rights are invaded and
without granting consequential relief, the court adds that "except for the
coercive element in the judgment or decree, we understand that there is
no difference between a declaratory judgment or decree and any other
judgment between opposing parties." The court points out that the
English and American courts have treated the rendering of declaratory
judgments as a matter "of practice and procedure, rather than one of
jurisdiction."51 In either case, they add, "The legislature had power to
pass the Act."
In 1930, the Wisconsin Supreme Court, in City of Milwaukee v.
Chicago & Northwestern Ry.,52 held that its 1927 Act (the Uniform
Act) was constitutional. In that case the city brought an action against
the railroad for a declaration that its own ordinance of 1902, by which
it had undertaken to maintain certain structures, was void, and that by
law this duty of maintenance fell upon the defendant railroad. In so
holding, the court concedes that the question might have been tried in
another form of action, but as it involved an actual controversy as to
legal rights, there was no reason why it could not be decided by declara-
tory judgment.5 3
"1274 U. S. 123, 47 Sup. Ct. 511 (1927).
'The court also cites Old Colony Trust Co. v. Commissioner of Internal
Revenue, 279 U. S. 716, 49 Sup. Ct. 499 (1929).
1 See cases cited in note 64, infra.
230 N. W. 626 (Wis. 1930). An earlier Wisconsin Act of 1919, § 2687m,
was repealed in 1923, after several cases had been decided under it, on the fear that,
in the light of the Anway case, the Act might be held unconstitutional. See (1923)
8 MARQUETTE L. Ray. 37 and (1924) 2 Wis. L. Rav. 376. The Uniform Act was
then -passed in 1927.
' In answer to the defendant's contention of unconstitutionality, on authority
of the Anway case, the court remarks that the Michigan court had in effect over-
ruled that decision in the Washington-Detroit Theater Co. case and that several
other states had held similar acts constitutional, that the Wisconsin Supreme Court
had sub silentio reached the same conclusion in two recent cases [Nash Sales, Inc.
v. City of Milwaukee, 198 Wis. 281, 224 N. W. 126 (1929); Rosenberg v. White-
fish Bay, 199 Wis. 214, 225 N. W. 838 (1929)], and that the Kansas case of State
v. Grove in a general way expresses the views of the Wisconsin court on the
question of constitutionality.
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Finally, the Indiana Supreme Court in 1930 upheld the Indiana
(Uniform) Act of 1919 in Zoercher v. Agler.5 4 In that case, certain tax-
payers brought an action for a declaratory judgment against the state
board of tax commissioners and the City of South Bend and others, al-
leging that a statute conferring revisory taxing powers on the state tax
board was unconstitutional. The court's attention was confined to the
question whether the plaintiff had a sufficiently substantial iriterest to
bring an action, on which an affirmatiye conclusion was reached. While
the plaintiff's rights were mainly "public," they were deemed to be suffi-
ciently affected indirectly to obtain a declaration, although the court
thought that usually "private rights" only are thus protected.55 On the
point of constitutionality, the court merely cites with approval the nu-
merous state cases which had held declaratory judgment statutes con-
stitutional.
United States Supreme Court
In 1927 the United States Supreme Court, in Liberty Warehouse Co.
v. Grannis,56 for the first time had occasion to consider the declaratory
judgment procedure. In the light of the ample discussions that had
taken place in the state courts, involving every phase of the procedure
and putting it to the most rigid tests of conformity to the elementary
requirements for the proper exercise of judicial power, it is unfortunate
that the Supreme Court, even though only by way of dictum, should
have ignored all this profound analysis and should have in practical ef-
fect adopted the discredited views of the Anway case in Michigan and
concluded that the declaratory judgment, on the supposed "authority"
of the Gordon and Muskrat cases, required the rendering of advisory
opinions or, as later implied, a determination of a moot case. Even the
magical words "cases" or "controversies," which, without adequate
justification, are deemed to give the judicial function in the federal
courts a quite different connotation from that known to state courts, can-
not explain so exceptional a conclusion. The fact is that the state courts,
in their examination of the declaratory judgment, have used tests of
justiciability quite as severe as any employed in a federal "case" or "con-
troversy." Those words, it is believed, have no charm which can justify
172 N. E. 186 (Ind. 1930) ; (1930) 6 INDIANA L. J. 118. In the recent Ken-
tucky case of Black v. Elkhorn Coal Corp., 233 Ky. 588, 26 S. W. (2d) 481 (1930),
in which the constitutionality of the Kentucky statute was sustained, a mortgage
bondholder sought to declare void a proposed lease of the mortgaged premises by
the trustee.
' Actually, it may be inferred that the plaintiffs were deemed to have a suffi-
cient private interest in the establishment of the legal relations they sought to have
determined.
273 U. S. 70, 47 Sup. Ct. 282 (1927).
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what would seem to be misconceptions as to what a declaratory judg-
ment is. For it is submitted that it is probably only on the foundation
of such a misunderstanding that a court could reach the conclusion that
an action'for a declaratory judgment, properly brought, lacks any of the
elements essential for the exercise of judicial power, namely, an issue
between contesting litigants involving their legal rights and resulting in a
final judgment.
The facts of the first Liberty Warehouse case were as follows:
Kentucky enacted a statute in 19 24 57 requiring tobacco warehousemen
who shall receive leaf tobacco for sale at public auction, to post notices
stating the name and address of the producer or owner whose tobacco
would each day be offered for sale, together with the number of pounds
sold and the price received on behalf of each seller, under penalty of a
fine of $50 to $100 per day for violations. It appears that the statute
was instigated by a large tobacco co-operative marketing association to
force the independent growers and producers into the association. Cer-
tain Kentucky warehousemen at once brought actions in the Kentucky
courts under the Kentucky Declaratory Judgment Act,58 citing the com-
monwealth attorneys as defendants, for a declaration that the Ware-
house Act was unconstitutional because of improper classification, un-
warranted burdens constituting lack of due process, interference with in-
terstate commerce, and violation of the anti-trust law. The Declaratory
Judgment Act, as is necessarily implied, even if unexpressed, provided
that an "actual controversy" must exist as a condition of the exercise of
judicial power.59 The Kentucky court, apparently without hesitation, ren-
dered a declaratory judgment holding the Warehouse Act constitu-
tional.60 In sustaining the declaratory judgment procedure as appro-
priate, the Kentucky court would seem to have acted properly.0 1
" "An Act regulating the sale of loose leaf tobacco at public auction in this
Commonwealth," Acts of 1924, c. 10.
'Acts of 1922, c. 83.
As to the possibility of misconceptions of the phrase "actual controversy,"
see Note (1926) 35 YALE L. J. 473, 475-476.
- Jewell Tobacco Warehouse Co. v. Kempner, 206 Ky. 667, 268 S. W. 342
(1925).
" In the following cases the declaratory judgment procedure was employed to
challenge the constitutionality or validity of a statute as applied to the plaintiff.
Little v. Smith, 124 Kan. 237, 257 Pac. 959 (1927) (cigarette advertising law in-
valid); Ware v. Ammon, 212 Ky. 152, 278 S. W. 593 (1925) (discriminatory dry-
cleaning law invalid) ; Path6 Exchange v. Cobb, 202' App. Div. 450, 195 N. Y.
Supp. 661 (3d Dept. 1922) (motion picture censorship law valid) ; Erwin Billiard
Parlor v. Buckner, 156 Tenn. 278, 300 S. W. 565 (1927) (discriminatory pool-room
law invalid) ; Utah State Fair Ass'n v. Green, 68 Utah 254, 249 Pac. 1016 (1926)
(parimutuel statute held to abrogate inconsistent ordinances) ; Lagoon Jockey Club
v. Davis County, 270 Pac. 543 (Utah 1928) (statute forbidding gambling pools not
repealed by later statute). But cf. Purity Oats Co. v. State, 125 Kan. 558,
264 Pac. 740 (1928) (declaration as to whether plaintiff was violating trading
stamp law refused). See also Hessick v. Moynihan, 83 Colo. 43, 262 Pac. 907
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Certain non-resident warehousemen, not satisfied with the Kentucky
result, then brought an action in the federal district court for Kentucky
under the federal Conformity Act 62 against the commonwealth attorney
charged with the duty of enforcing the Warehouse Act and who, it was
alleged, had already prepared indictments against the plaintiffs, for a
declaratory judgment that the Act was unconstitutional for the reasons
above mentioned and that they were not subject to the penalties provided
for. The district court declined to exercise jurisdiction under the Con-
formity Act, and on appeal by direct writ of error to the Supreme
Court, that court not only affirmed the decigion as to the impropriety of
thus using the Conformity Act in a matter, according to the court, not
involving a question of "practice, pleading and forms and modes of
proceeding," but suggested that the issue presented no "case" or "con-
troversy" within the meaning of article 3, section 2, of the Federal
Constitution.
63
Although the action for a declaration, known by other names but
long used under specific circumstances in the United States, does, it is
believed, involve distinctly and exclusively matters of "practice, plead-
ings and forms and modes of proceeding, ' 64 it is possible that the result
(1927) ; City of Wichita v. Wichita Gas Co., 126 Kan. 769, 271 Pac. 272 (1928) ;
Adams v. Slavin, 225 Ky. 135, 7 S. W. (2d) -836 (1928) ; Pettit v. White County,
152 Tenn. 660, 280 S. W. 688 (1926); State Board of Examiners v. Standard
Engineering Co., 157 Tenn. 157, 7 S.'W. (2d) 47 (1928).
117 STAT. 196 (1872), 28 U. S. C. A. § 724 (1926). The principal clause reads:
"The practice, pleadings and forms and modes of proceeding in civil causes, other
than equity and admiralty causes, in the circuit or district courts, shall conform, as
near as may be, to the practice, pleadings, and forms and modes of proceeding
existing at the time in like causes in the courts of record of the State within which
such circuit or district courts are held, any rule of court to the contrary notwith-
standing." See Coffey v. United States, 117 U. S. 233, 234, 6 Sup. Ct. 717 (1886).
An extended account of the history and application of the Conformity Act will be
found in 25 C. 3. 797 et seq. On the ineffectiveness of the Conformity Act, see
Note (1927) 36 YALE L. J. 853.
Had the Kentucky declaratory judgment statute been deemed to create a new
equitable right of a substantive character, it might have been enforced in a federal
court. Clark v. Smith, 13 Pet. 195, 203 (U. S. 1839) ; Pusey & Jones Co. v. Hans-
sen, 261 U. S. 491, 498, 43 Sup. Ct. 454 (1923). But if deemed an equitable right
of a remedial character, it could not be enforced in a federal court. Henrietta
Mills v. Rutherford County, 281 U. S. 121, 128, 50 Sup. Ct. 270 (1930).
' "The judicial Power shall extend to all Cases, in Law and Equity, arising
under this Constitution, the Laws of the United States and Treaties made, or which
shall be made, under their Authority . . . to Controversies ...between Citizens
of different states," etc. The draftsmen of the Constitution hardly purported to
expound any new or original conception by the use of the phrase "judicial power,"
but meant to embody therein the customary meaning which experience of thejudicial function had attributed to the words. See Frankfurter and Landis, Power
of Congress over Procedure in Criminal Contempts (1924) 37 HARv. L. REV. 1010,
1017; THAYER, LEGAL ESSAYS (1908) 43; Note (1927) 41 HARv. L. REv. 232.
See Guaranty Trust Co. v. Hannay, [1915] 2 K. B. 536. "But if its only
effect is to provide that the court may deal with a matter with which it can already
deal, in a different manner under different circumstances, and when brought before
it by a different person, it is, in my opinion, only dealing with practice and pro-
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reached in the case may be sustained for reasons not referred to by the
court. Congress has by section 266 of the Judicial Code surrounded with
specific safeguards, such as the provision for three judges, the grant of
injunctions by federal courts against the enforcement of state statutes.
Hence it may perhaps be proper-although it was only the harsh in-
junction, and not the power to decide, that was attacked-not to permit
these limitations to be avoided by invoking in the federal courts the de-
claratory judgment procedure under the Conformity Act in those states
which authorize their courts to render such judgments. It may also
be said that the term "practice, pleading and forms and modes of pro-
ceeding" has been confined in practical application to the most technical
matters of pleading and practice, 5 which might justify the result
reached, but not the explanation given by the court.
In view of the conclusion that a federal court could not entertain
the proceeding, it is perhaps proper to infer that what is said about the
nature of an action for a declaratory judgment and its presentation of
a "case" or "controversy" is dictum only.
The opinion of Justice Sanford states that
"the sole purpose of the petition, is to obtain a declaration from the District
Court of the rights and duties of the plaintiffs under the Warehouse Act of
1924, and a determination of the extent to which they must comply with its
provisions in the conduct of their business."
This appears to be only a partial statement of the petition, although the
plaintiffs doubtless aroused the prejudice of the court by the awkward
cedure and is intr, vires" (by Pickford, L. J., at 563). ". . . I can not doubt that
had the Court of Chancery in those days (before 1852) thought it expedient to
make merely declaratory judgments they would have claimed and exercised the
right to do so. It is amongst other things to amend the practice and procedure of
the Court of Chancery in this respect that § 50 of the Act of 1852 was passed.
The preamble of the statute makes this clear" (by Bankes, L. J., at 568). Bankes,
L. J., quotes Fletcher Moulton, L. J., in saying "that an action thus framed (for
a declaration of right) is the most convenient method of enabling the subject to
test the justifiability of proceedings on the part of permanent officials purporting
to act under statutory provisions" (ibid., at 569). "The rule relates to procedure
only and must be so construed." Lord Davey, in Barroughcloff v. Brown, [1897]
A. C. 615, 624.
See editorial comment by F. W. Grinnell, (April, 1928) 13 MAss. L. Q. 50-52;
A. C. 615, 624.
See editorial comment by F. J. Grinnell, (April, 1928) 13 MAss. L. Q. 50-52;
Morton v. Pacific Constr. Co., 283 Pac. 281 (Ariz. 1929) ; Braman v. Babcock, 98
Conn. 549, 120 Ati. 150 (1923) ; Sheldon v. Powell, 128 So. 258, 263 (Fla. 1930) ;
In re Kariher's Petition, 284 Pa. 455, 131 Atl. 265 (1925). The declaratory judg-
ment is always indexed under such heads as Actions, Practice, Procedure, or Judg-
ments, and is found in Practice Acts, Codes of Civil Procedure, or special statutes
regarded as procedural. There-seems to be no authority contra.
'3 FosTm, FEDRA. PRAcricE (6th ed. 1921) § 453; Note (1922) 35 HAIv. L,
REv. 602. But see Guffey v. Smith, 237 U. S. 101, 113, 35 Sup. Ct. 526 (1915).
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drafting of the paragraph in question."' This should not, however, ha-Ve
influenced the court. The petition requested a declaration that the
Warehouse Act was unconstitutional and invalid, and that the plaintiffs
were not subject to the prescribed penalties, the identical prayer that
would have accompanied a bill for an injunction, except that injunctive
relief was not requested. The language used by the court might convey
the impression that the plaintiffs were asking for some strange kind of
declaration as to how to run their business, whereas essentially they
asked only a declaration that the Act was unconstitutional. The court
then goes on to say:
"While the Commonwealth Attorney is made a defendant as a representa-
tive of the Commonwealth, there is no semblance of any adverse litigation
with him individually; there being neither any allegation that the plaintiffs
have done or contemplate doing any of the things forbidden by the Act before
being advised by the court as to their rights nor any allegation that the Com-
monwealth Attorney has threatened to take or contemplates taking any action
against them for any violation of the Act, either past or prospective. And no
relief of any kind is prayed against him, by restraining action on his part or
otherwise."
This, then, is the crux of the basis for the court's belief that the
issue presented no "case" or "controversy." The reasoning deserves
examination. When an injunction is sought against an attorney-gen-
eral to prevent the enforcement of a statute,67 there is no adverse litiga-
tion with him individually, but only in his official capacity as the en-
forcer of the law. That is what the defendant was in the instant case,
and he had, in fact, it appears, prepared indictments against the plain-
tiffs. It is understood that the plaintiffs were later fined. But even if
he had prepared no indictments, the mere existence of the statute was a
threat to the plaintiffs' business and gave them a clear right to an in-
'This one paragraph of the petition stated that the plaintiffs were making the
application "for the purpose of securing a declaration of their rights and duties
under such Acts of 1924, and for the purpose of having this court determine
whether in the conduct of their business, it will be necessary for them to comply
with the provisions of said Act of 1924, or whether Chapter 10 of the Act of 1924
is invalid in whole or in part, and if so, in what part." This form of petition, while
not uncommon in England and the dominions, where they have long been familiar
with the procedure for a declaration of rights, is perhaps open to criticism in the
United States, for it looks as if the plaintiff is asking for an advisory opinion, and
not a judgment. Knowing that courts are frequently hostile to anything which has
even the appearance of novelty, lawyers should be careful to frame petitions so as
to request a declaration of specific findings or conclusions, and not ask generally
for a declaration as to whether they have certain rights, as if seeking merely advice.
"Truax v. Raich, 239 U. S. 33, 36 Sup. Ct. 7 (1915) ; Terrace v. Thompson,
263 U. S. 197, 44 Sup. Ct. 15 (1923) ; Packard v. Banton, 264 U. S. 140, 44 Sup. Ct.
257 (1924); Hygrade Provision Co. v. Sherman, 266 U. S. 497, 45 Sup. Ct. 141(1925); Tyson & Bro.-United Theatre Ticket Offices v. Banton, 273 U. S. 418, 47
Sup. Ct. 426 (1927); Beatrice Creamery Co. v. Cline, 9 F.(2d) 176 (D. Colo.
1925).
COLUMBIA LAW REVIEW
junction, had they sought it. A fortiori, they were entitled to the milder
relief by declaration of rights, merely a judgment that the Act was
unconstitutional. The term "declaration of rights" is a term of art, sanc-
tioned by usage in England since 1852, and in Scotland since the six-
teenth century. It should not have aroused judicial hostility. It signi-
fies judgment, decision, holding, determination, ruling, finding, adjudica-
tion. Disregarding the fact that the plaintiffs later obtained, it is
understood, a temporary injunction against the enforcement of the Act in
the federal court, how is it possible that the issue presents a "case" or
"controversy" when the prayer is for an injunction, but not a "case" or
"controversy" when a mere declaration is 'sought? That the court seems
to have misconceived the nature of a declaratory action, is indicated by
the assertion that, evidently to the court's surprise and allegedly sup-
porting its conviction that no "controversy" was involved, "no relief
of any kind is prayed against him." 68  But the declaration of the un-
constitutionality of the Warehouse Act and of the plaintiffs' immunity
from its penalties, is all the relief they required. Perhaps this seemed
novel to the court, but for many years this has been the way in which the
validity of statutes and ordinances and of official action under legislative
authority has been challenged in England and throughout the British
colonies and in those of our states that have enacted a declaratory judg-
ment statute.69 It is common parlance to "declare" a statute unconsti-
'In view of the suggestion that coercive relief or execution may be deemed
necessary to a final judgment, the Supreme Court has since taken pains to point
out that execution is not a necessary adjunct of the judicial function or of a judg-
ment. In Fidelity National Bank & Trust Co. v. Swope, 274 U. S. 123, 132, 47
Sup. Ct. 511 (1927), the Supreme Court said: "While ordinarily a case or judicial
controversy results in a judgment requiring award of process of execution to carry
it into effect, such relief is not an indispensable adjunct of the exercise of the
judicial function," citing cases. This was amply reaffirmed in Old Colony Trust
Co. v. Commissioner of Internal Revenue, 279 U. S. 716, 725, 49 Sup. Ct. 499
(1929), by Taft, C. J.
' See the numerous cases involving the construction or interpretation of stat-
utes and ordinances or of administrative action under them cited in Borchard, The
Declaratory Judgment (1918) 28 YALE L. J. 135-136; Note (1926) 35 YALE,
L. 3. 477; Note (1930) 43 HARv. L. REv. 1290; and supra note 61.
In Williams v. Riley, 280 U. S. 78, 79, 50 Sup. Ct. 63 (1929), the Supreme
Court, by McReynolds, 3., says: "The prayer is for a decree declaring [the stat-
utes'] invalidity, and for an injunction restraining defendant from attempting to
enforce them."
A brief survey of recent Supreme Court reports indicates that the common
form for praying immunity from the requirements of a statute, ordinance, or ad-
ministrative order is to request that the official action be declared invalid, plus an
injunction against its execution or enforcement. The principal goal is the declara-
tion of invalidity; the injunction is ancillary or incidental and generally is not
needed. Justiciability lies in the respective assertion and denial of invalidity (or
validity), and is not created by the appended request for an injunction. In the fol-
lowing cases, the prayer for relief is indicated after the citation. 1. Black & White
Taxicab, etc., Co. v. Brown & Yellow Taxicab, etc., Co., 276 U. S. 518, 48 Sup.
Ct. 404 (1928) (declaration that plaintiff's contract is exclusive, plus injunction
against defendant's violation). Cf. formal declaratory judgments in Rely-a-Bell
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tutional or constitutional. The extensive literature on the subject is
not even mentioned by the court, and there is no evidence that any of it
Burglar Fire Alarm Co. v. Eisler, [1926] 1 Ch. 609; Commonwealth v. Colonial
Ammunition Co., 34 C. L. R. 198 (Australia, 1924). 2. John P. King Mfg. Co. v.
City Council of Augusta, 277 U. S. 100, 48 Sup. Ct. 489 (1928) (declaration that
ordinance invalid, plus injunction). 3. Nectow v. City of Cambridge, 277 U. S.
183, 48 Sup. Ct. 447 (1928) (declaration that zoning ordinance invalid, plus manda-
tory injunction to issue permit to build). Cf. formal declaratory judgments in
In re Forsey and Hollechone's Contract, [1927] 2 Ch. 378 (town planning scheme
as an incumbrance) ; Amos v. Wellington City Corp., [1921] N. Z. 227; James v.
Waimairi County Council, [1929] N. Z. 449 (all building permits rejected). 4. Le-
high Valley R. Co. v. Board of Public Utility Com'rs, 278 U. S. 24, 49 Sup. Ct. 69(1928) (declaration that administrative order unreasonable, plus injunction.). Cf.
formal declaration in Ellis v. Chairman, etc., of the Hutt County, 29 N. Z. 588(1910). 5. Herkness v. Irion, Commissioner of Conservation, 278 U. S. 92, 49
Sup. Ct. 40 (1928) (declaration of plaintiff's privilege to erect carbon black fac-
tory, plus injunction to prevent state interference by refusal of license). Cf.
formal declaratory judgments in Committee of Direction of Fruit Marketing v.
Collins, 36 C. L. R. 410 (Australia, 1925); Hardley v. Mount Roskell Road Board,
11923] N. Z. 897 (administrative right to refuse approval of building plan). 6.
Hunt, Governor of Arizona,. v. United States, 278 U. S. 96, 49 Sup. Ct. 38 (1928)(declaration that Governor had no right to arrest United States agents, plus in-junction restraining such arrest). Cf. formal declaratory judgments in Mayor,
etc., of Wellington v. Attorney-General, 33 N. Z. 1458 (1914) ; Taratahi Dairy Co.
ct al. v. Attorney-General, [1917] N. Z. 1. 7. Louis K. Liggett Co. v. Baldridge,
Attorney-General, 278 U. S. 105, 49 Sup. Ct. 57 (1928) (declaration that statute
was invalid, plus injunction). Cf. formal declaratory judgments in W. & A. Mc-
Arthur v. State of Queensland, 28 C. L. R. 530 (Australia, 1920) ; Fairfax v. New
South Wales, 39 C. L. R. 139 (Australia, 1927). 8. Washihgton ex rel. Seattle
Title Trust Co. v. Roberge, 278 U. S. 116, 49 Sup. Ct. 50 (1928) (declaration that
condition of zoning law requiring consent of two-thirds of property owners was
invalid, plus mandamus to issue permit). Cf. James v. Waimairi County Council,[1929] N. Z. 449. 9. Williams v. Standard Oil Co., 278 U. S. 235, 49 Sup. Ct. 115(1929) (declaration that statute regulating prices invalid, plus injunction). Cf.
formal declaratory judgments in Jones v. Metropolitan Meat Industry Board, 37
C. L. R. 252 (Australia, 1925) (regulation of prices) ; Taratahi Dairy Co. v. At-
torney-General, [19171 N. Z. 1 (administrative control of exports); Hackett v.
Lauder, [1917] N. Z. 947 (validity of war regulations against treating). 10. United
States v. Missouri Pacific Ry. Co., 278 U. S. 269, 49 Sup. Ct. 133 (1929) (declara-
tion that order of I. C. C. invalid, plus injunction) ; United Fuel Gas Co. v. Rail-
road Comm., 278 U. S. 300, 49 Sup. Ct. 150 (1929) (ibid.). 11. Wisconsin v.
Illinois, 278 U. S. 367, 49 Sup. Ct. 163 (1929) (declaration that water diversion
invalid, plus injunction). Cf. declaratory judgments in New South Wales v.
Commonwealth, 38 C. L. R. 74 (Australia, 1926) (right to Garden Is.); Chairman
of Eltham County v. Chairman of Waimate West County, 29 N. Z. 309 (1909)(apportionment of financial liability) ; Mayor of Auckland v. Mayor of Mount
Eden, 33 N. Z. 97 (1913) (apportionment of morgue expenses). 12. Frost v.
Corporation Commission of Okla., 278 U. S. 515, 49 Sup. Ct. 235 (1929) (declara-
tion that mandatory license was invalid, plus injunction). Cf. declaratory judg-
ments involving mandatory directions in statutes in Aotea District Maori Land
Board v. Handley, 32 N. Z. 706 (1913) ; Boyd v. Mayor of Wellington, [1924] N. Z.
1174. 13. Gilchrist v. Interborough Rapid Transit Co., 279 U. S. 159, 49 Sup. Ct.
282 (1929) (declaration that contract rates confiscatory, plus injunction). Cf. de-
claratory judgment in Petone Borough v. Lower Hunt Borough, [1918] N. Z. 844.
14. Leonard v. Earle, 279 U. S. 392, 49 Sup. Ct. 372 (1929) (declaration that stat-
ute requiring surrender of 10% of oyster shells as condition of license invalid,
plus mandamus to issue without condition). Cf. declaratory judgments in Amos
v. Wellington City Corp., [1921] N. Z. 227 (building condition); Wharton v.
Registrar of Patents, [1921] N. Z. 817 (patent priority). 15. St. Louis-San Fran-
cisco Ry. Co. v. Alabama Public Service Comm., 279 U. S. 560, 49 Sup. Ct 383(1929) ("declaration" that statute forbidding abandonment of service invalid, plus
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was examined. The state cases are not referred to. In a request for an
injunction against the enforcement of an unconstitutional statute aimed
at the plaintiffs, it is not usual to allege "that the plaintiffs have done or
contemplate doing any of the things forbidden by the Act," notably when
relief is sought from newly imposed burdens, nor to allege "that the
Commonwealth Attorney has threatened to take or contemplates taking
any action against them for any violation of the Act." The very fact
that they had under penalty to change their mode of doing business,
in order to comply with the Act,70 is sufficient allegation of injury, and
lays the foundation for relief against the enforcement of the statute.
Declaratory relief was as effective as coercive relief. In Village of
Euclid v. Ambler Realty Co., 7 1 where the mere enactment of a zoning
ordinance, without any attempt to apply it to the plaintiff, was deemed a
sufficient basis for injunctive relief, the court said that "the existence
and maintenance of the ordinance, in effect, constitutes a present inva-
sion of appellee's property rights and a threat to continue it." So in
Pierce v. Society of Sisters,72 the court enjoined the enforcement of an
injunction). 16. Standard Oil Co. v. City of Marysville, 279 U. S. 582, 49 Sup.
Ct. 430 (1929) (declaration that ordinance requiring storage tanks underground
invalid, plus injunction). Cf. declarations in Islington Estate Co. v. Mount Roskill
Road Board, 30 N. Z. 91 (1910); Boyd v. Mayor of, etc., Onehunga, 34 N. Z. 993(1915), [1916] N. Z. 713. 17. White River Lumber Co. v. Arkansas, 279 U. S.
692, 49 Sup. Ct. 457 (1929) (declaration that back taxes were due "and declaring
them a lien on the land taxed"). Cf. declarations in Macclesfield Corp. v. Gov-
ernors of Free Grammar Schools, [1921] 2 Ch. 189 (charge for street improve-
ments) ; Mayor, etc., of Sunderland v. Priestman, [1927] 2 Ch. 107. 18. Kirk v.
Maumee Valley Electric Co., 279 U. S. 797, 49 Sup. Ct. 507 (1929) (declaration
that plaintiff was immune from interference with his water rights, plus injunction).
Cf. declarations in Westwood v. Heywood, [19211 2 Ch. 130 (water supply);
Long v. Gowlett, [1923] 2 Ch. 177 (right to pass over river) ; Knight v. Bolton,
[1924] N. Z. 806, 1043 (boundary walls changed). 19. Gonzalez v. Roman Catholic
Archbishop of Manila, 280 U. S. 1, 50 Sup. Ct. 5 (1929) (declaration that plain-
tiff entitled to certain appointment, plus direction to appoint). Cf. declarations in
Heywood v. Bishop of Manchester, 12 Q. B. D. 404 (1884) (right to have cleric
appointed) ; Welsh v. Bishop of Peterborough, 15 Q. B. D. 432 (1885) (right to
appoint cleric) ; Cannel v. Lawther, [19141 3 K. B. 1135 (duty to employ as pilot) ;
Monckton v. Commonwealth, 27 C. L. R. 149 (Australia, 1920) (right to civil
service appointment).
O The statute imposed new duties and forbade nothing, except, by penalty,
breach of the new duties. The court should not, it is respectfully submitted, have
used the words "before being advised by the court as to their rights." (Italics sup-
plied.) The word "advised" seems tendential.
'272 U. S. 365, 47 Sup. Ct. 114 (1926). Cf. West v. City of Wichita, 118
Kan. 265, 267, 234 Pac. 978, 979 (1925), where a declaratory judgment to have a
zoning law declared invalid was refused, because the plaintiff did not state specif-
ically enough the purpose for which he desired to use his property. In Terrace v.
Thompson, supra note 67, the court says: "The threatened enforcement of the law
deters them." In the Liberty Warehouse case, indictments had actually been pre-
pared against the plaintiffs, under which they were later fined. Had an injunction
been prayed, a three-judge court would have had to be assembled. Stratton v. St.
Louis S. W. Ry. Co., 282 U. S. 10, 51 Sup. Ct. 8 (1930).
'2268 U. S. 510, 535, 45 Sup. Ct. 571, 573 (1925). See Pennsylvania v. Vest
Virgiiiia, 262 U. S. 553, 591, 593, 43 Sup. Ct. 658 (1923).
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Oregon statute two years before it was to com6 into effect on the ground
that the plaintiffs had a present interest to prevent a future interference
with their privilege to have pupils enter their parochial schools. Leav-
ing aside the fact that indictments had been prepared, the mere existence
of the Kentucky Warehouse Act, with its heavy penalties, was a threat
against the plaintiffs' business, more immediate than the injury threat-
ened by the Euclid zoning law or the Oregon school law. Its very ex-
istence was a command to the attorney-general to enforce it. No
special threat to enforce a statute has heretofore been required as a con-
dition of jurisdiction to issue an injunction. The statute imposing the
duty to enforce presents the attorney-general as an "adverse" party and
the issue as a "case" or "controversy." Had the plaintiffs prayed an in-
junction, it is hard to believe, in the light of the cases mentioned, that
the court would have declined jurisdiction or would have thought that
the issue presented no "controversy."
The fact is that the writ of injunction has been stretched far be-
yond its original scope for the very purpose of enabling constitutional
questions to be presented for decision. The injunction often constitutes V-
only a plausible form of proceeding, a blind, for obtaining from the
court, a declaratory judgment. It is the respective assertion and denial
of rights leading to a determination of rights, and not the ancillary in-
junction or -mandamus-usually pro forma only-which creates justicia-
bility. When, therefore, a plaintiff honestly asks for the declaration of
unconstitutionality which alone he seeks and which will answer all his
and the attorney-general's purposes, why should the court deny him
this relief? The statute, penal in effect, is aimed directly at him and
his business and the attorney-general is lawfully charged with its en-
forcement. Can any clearer case be imagined of adverse parties pres-
ently interested in an issue involving threatened or endangered property
rights ?
But the declaratory judgment in this connection serves another use-
ful purpose. It often happens that courts are unwilling to grant injunc-
tions to restrain the enforcement of penal statutes or ordinances, and
relegate the plaintiff to his option either to violate the statute and take
his chances in testing constitutionality on a criminal prosecution, or
else to forego under fear of prosecution the exercise of his claimed
rights. Into this dilemma no civilized legal system operating under a
constitution should force any person. The court in effect, by refusing
an injunction, informs the prospective victim that the only way to de-
termine whether the suspect is a mushroom or a toadstool is to eat it.73
" See Shredded Wheat Co. v. City of Elgin, 284 Il1. 389, 120 N. E. 248 (1918).
If the ordinance was invalid, said the court, the prosecution would fail and the
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Assuming that the plaintiff has a vital interest in the enforcement of the
challenged statute or ordinance, there is no reason why a declaratory
judgment should not be issued instead of compelling a violation of the
statute as a condition precedent to challenging its constitutionality.
7
'
The authorities cited by the Supreme Court in support of its de-
cision in the Liberty Warehouse case, like those cited by the Michigan
court in the Anway case, do not seem, with all respect, to be relevant to
the issue before the court. Indeed, the reasoning of the cases cited
seems to lead to the opposite result, for the conditions of fact in the
Liberty Warehouse case meet squarely all the requirements laid down
for a "case" or "controversy," and with a federal declaratory judgment
statute, it could have been adjudicated in the federal courts. Chief Jus-
tice Marshall in Osborn v. United States Bank had explained that the
judicial "power is capable of acting only when the subject is submitted
to it by a party who asserts his rights in the form prescribed by law."'75
In the Gordon case the decision of the court would not have been final,
because subject to review by the Treasury Department." Naturally
enough, jurisdiction was declined. So appellate jurisdiction from an
administrative determination, and not a judgment, cannot be conferred
plaintiff would not be injured; if it was valid, there was no ground on which its
enforcement should be enjoined. See Girard Trust Co. v. Tremblay Motor Co
291. Pa. 507, 140 Atl. 506 (1928). See also Iowa Motor Vehicle Ass'n v. Board o?
Railroad Commissioners, 202 Iowa 85, 209 N. W. 511 (1926); Note (1926) 12
IowA L. REv. 62, 65; and see cases cited supra note 61.
Representative Gilbert of Kentucky, in speaking to the federal declaratoryjudgments bill on Jan. 25, 1928, said: "You have the same court, the same juris-
diction, the same procedure, the same parties and the same questions. Under the
present law you take a step in the dark and then turn on the light to see if you
stepped into a hole. Under the declaratory judgment law you turn on the light
and then take the step." 69 CONG. REc. 2108 (1928).
An injunction is often denied, after prolonged litigation, on the ground that
there is an adequate remedy at law, e.g., in seeking to restrain the alleged improper
collection of taxes, where the court suggests payment and then suit to recover.
Henrietta Mills v. Rutherford County, 281 U. S. 121, 50 Sup. Ct. 270 (1930). The
most efficient way to try such issues is by declaratory judgment.
"'The severity of the penalty alone has persuaded the courts on occasion to
enjoin the enforcement of statutes until their constitutionality could be judicially
determined. Ex parte Young, 209 U. S. 123, 147, 28 Sup. Ct. 441 (1908) ; Wadley
Southern Ry. Co. v. Georgia, 235 U. S. 651, 35 Sup. Ct. 214 (1915).
59 Wheat. 738 (U. S. 1824). So in Cherokee Nation v. Georgia, 5 Pet. 1,
75 (U. S. 1831) : "It is only where the rights of persons or property are involved,
and when such rights can be presented under some judicial form of proceedings,
that courts of justice can interpose relief."
" Gordon v. United States, supra note 10. Similar lack of finality barredjudicial cognizance of cases in Hayburn's case, 2 Dall. 409 (1792) ; United States
v. Ferreira, 13 How. 40 (1851). When the statute involved in the Gordon case
was changed, giving the court's decision final and binding force, unreviewable by
any other authority, it was sustained. United States v. Jones, 119 U. S. 477, 7
Sup. Ct. 283 (1886).
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on the Supreme Court.71 In the Muskrat case,1 8 Congress conferred on
named Indians the privilege of suing in the Court of Claims to determine
the constitutionality of a prior Act of Congress. There was no evidence
that the Indians named had any personal interest in the matter, that any
property of theirs would be affected by the decision or that any party
or officer had any adverse interest. The elements of an adversary pro-
ceeding involving plaintiffs' or defendants' interests were lacking. The
Muskrat case has now been so thoroughly explained, that there is no
longer any justification for confusing it with an action for a declaratory
judgment. In Fairchild v. Hughes, 9 a taxpayer sought to enjoin the
proclamation by the Secretary of State of the Nineteenth Amendment;
the suit was dismissed because his interest was deemed insufficient and
because the issue before the court was not one "for determination by
such regular proceedings as are established by law or custom for the
protection or enforcement of rights, or the prevention, redress or punish-
ment of wrongs."1' s State courts are much more willing than the fed-
" Keller v. Potomac Electric Co., 261 U. S. 428, 444, 43 Sup. Ct. 445, 449
(1924) ; Postum Cereal Co. v. California Fig Nut Co., 272 U. S. 693, 47 Sup. Ct.
284 (1927) ; Federal Radio Commission v. General Electric Co., 281 U. S. 464, 50
Sup. Ct 389 (1930).
SMuskrat v. United States, 219 U. S. 346, 357, 31 Sup. Ct. 250 (1911). The
opinion of Hon. Charles E. Hughes, now Chief Justice, to the effect that the
Muskrat case presented no obstacle to the constitutionality of the declaratory judg-
ment, reported in (1920) 45 A. B. A. REP. 266, (1920) 91 CENT. L. J. 435, and
(1921) 53 CHICAGo LEGAL NEws 205, reads as follows: "It is true that the
Muskrat case dealt with the validity of an Act of Congress, but the ground of the
decision was the fundamental one that the judicial power extended to 'cases and
controversies,' that is, that the judicial power was 'the right to determine actual
controversies arising between adverse litigants, duly instituted in courts of proper
jurisdiction.' (219 U. S., p. 361.) It was not because the question was the deter-
mination of the validity of an Act of Congress, but because this question did not
arise in an actual controversy, that the court found itself without power to deter-
mine it. Had there been an actual controversy, the question of the validity of an
Act of Congress, or any other question properly brought before the court, could
have been determined. But in the absence of an actual controversy, neither that
question nor any other could properly be determined by the court .. "
"I do not think, therefore, that it distinguishes the Muskrat case to say that
it related to the determination of constitutional questions, for this fails to state the
ground upon which the court found itself unable to determine the constitutional
question... The point of distinction, it seems to me, should be, and it is sufficient
to state, simply that the proposed legislation is intended to deal only with actual
controversies and proposes that where there is an actual controversy between liti-
gants, the court may render a declaratory judgment."
" 258 U. S. 126, 129, 42 Sup. Ct. 274 (1922).
' One of the most commonly accepted definitions of the concept "cases" and
"controversies" is that given by Mr. Justice Field in In re Pacific Railway Com-
mission, 32 Fed. 241, 255 (C. C. N. D. Calif. 1887) : "By cases and controversies
are intended the claims of litigants brought before the courts for determination
by such regular proceedings as are established by law or custom for the protection
or enforcement of rights, or the prevention, redress, or punishment of wrongs.
Whenever the claim of a party under the constitution, laws, or treaties of the
United States takes such a form that the judicial power is capable of acting upon
it, then it has become a case. The term implies the existence of present or possible
adverse parties whose contentions are submitted to the court for adjudication."
(Italics supplied.)
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eral courts to see in a taxpayer a person having sufficient interest to
challenge a statute requiring the expenditure of money or official ac-
tion.8 ' In such a case the Supreme Court has said :2
"The party who invokes the judicial power must be able to show not only that
the statute is invalid but that he has sustained or is immediately in danger
of sustaining some direct injury as the result of its enforcement, and not
merely that he suffers in some indefinite way in common with people generally."
Certainly the Liberty Warehouse Company met this requirement.
On several occasions states have sought to prevent the enforcement
of federal statutes. Leaving aside those in which jurisdiction was re-
fused lVecause the issue raised was political, 3 the Supreme Court seems
to have leaned back pretty far in avoiding a decision not only where
abuse of federal power was alleged in matters of general public inter-
est,8 but also where the property rights of the state were most directly
involved.8 5 It seems unfortunate that the courts should refuse their
aid in settling controversies which involve adverse parties representing
the public and which disturb important property interests, until actual
damage is done. But when private interests are involved, this is all the
more reason why the declaratory action designed to remove or dissipate
clouds from the plaintiff's rights should be sustained, if properly before
the court in an adversary proceeding.
The Liberty Warehouse decision has been uniformly condemned by
commentators because of its confused reasoning and of its misconcep-
" Zoercher v. Agler, 172 N. E. 186 (Ind. 1930).
' Frothingham v. Mellon, 262 U. S. 447, 488, 43 Sup. Ct. 597, 601 (1923). See
also Williams v. Riley, 280 U. S. 78, 50 Sup. Ct. 63 (1929).
Georgia v. Stanton, 6 Wall. 50 (U. S. 1867); Pacific States Tel. & Tel.
Co. v. Oregon, 223 U. S. 118, 32 Sup. Ct. 224 (1912) ; Mountain Timber Co. v.
Washington, 243 U. S. 219, 37 Sup. Ct. 260 (1917). See Weston, Political Ques-
tions (1925) 38 HARV. L. Ray. 296.
' State of Texas v. Interstate Commerce Commission, 258 U. S. 158, 162, 42
Sup. Ct. 261, 263 (1922) (effort of state to annul action of Railroad Labor Board
in raising wages of railroad employees in the state) ; Massachusetts v. Mellon,
262 U. S. 447, 488, 43 Sup. Ct. 597, 601 (1923) (effort to have Federal Maternity
Act declared void, because its purpose was to induce the states to yield their sov-
ereign rights. Jurisdiction was declined because the state was under no obligation
to make an appropriation, without which no federal appropriation was possible). As
a taxpayer thus cannot bring an action, in the federal courts, the state will, in
order to test the Act, have to make an appropriation, and then perhaps a taxpayer
may enjoin the state appropriation. Even this attempt might fail.
' See New Jersey v. Sargent, 269 U. S. 328, 330, 46 Sup. Ct. 122 (1926), in
which the state sought to enjoin the enforcement as unconstitutional of the Federal
Water Power Act, on the ground that its proprietary interest in its water re-
sources from which it derived revenue would be impaired. Because federal action
to license the taking of water had not yet been undertaken, the court thought the
issue an "abstract question." It is hard to believe that so vital and practical a
question was "abstract." See Note (1926) 35 YALE L. J. 867. Cf. Pennsylvania
v. West Virginia, 262 U. S. 553, 43 Sup. Ct. 658 (1923).
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tions.86 While the language used by Justice Sanford is susceptible of
a variety of meanings, the case opened a path in the Supreme Court
approximately as unfortunate as that taken by the Michigan Supreme
Court in the Anway case.
In the second Liberty Warehouse case,8 7 the Burley Tobacco Grow-
ers' Co-operative Marketing Association brought an action against the
Liberty Warehouse Co. to recover a penalty under the cooperative
marketing act for knowingly aiding and inducing a member of the as-
sociation to violate his contract with the plaintiff association. The de-
fendant counterclaimed, making a separate defense by setting up the
unconstitutionality of the cooperative marketing act; in that defense,
it asked for a declaratory judgment that the act was unconstitutional
on the grounds stated in its original action. The Kentucky court, hav-
ing already held the cooperative marketing act constitutional, granted
a motion to strike this defense from the defendant's counterclaim. The
granting of the motion to strike was alleged as a denial of the def end-
ant's federal right to due process.
The United States Supreme Court held the allegations unfounded,
on the ground that proceedings in state courts must conform to the
reasonable requirements of local law-a matter primarily for those
courts to determine, and not presenting a federal question. McReynolds,
J., then went on to remark: "Apparently the declaratory judgment
statute authorizes plaintiffs only to ask for judgments."88 After quoting
section 6 of the Act providing that the court may refuse to declare
rights when the decision would not terminate the uncertainty or con-
troversy giving rise to the action, or, in any case, where the declaration
or construction is not necessary or proper at the time, the court pro-
ceeds: "This court has no jurisdiction to review a mere declaratory
judgment."
The two quoted sentences in this paragraph seem hard to support.
No authority can be cited to show that plaintiffs only may ask for de-
claratory judgments. On the contrary, innumerable cases in England and
the United States demonstrate that defendants in their counterclaims
'* See Note (1927) 25 MIcH. L. Rav. 529; Note (1927) 100 CENT. L. J. 95;
Note (1927) 40 HAEv. L. REv. 903; Note (1928) 41 HARv. L. REv. 232; Note
(1927) 13 VA. L. REv. 644; Note (1927) 36 YALE L. J. 845.
"Liberty Warehouse Co. v. Burley Tobacco Growers' Co-op. Marketing Ass'n,
276 U. S. 71, 89, 48 Sup. Ct. 291, 294 (1928).
"This dictum is believed to be without support, notwithstanding that the
judgment must be asked by petition. Defendants frequently request declarations by
answer or counterclaim, and no statute undertakes to forbid this. Mayor and
Council of Bayonne v. East Jersey Water Co., 108 Atl. 121 '(N. J. 1919) ; Path6
Exchange v. Cobb, 202 App. Div. 450, 195 N. Y. Supp. 661, aff'd, 236 N. Y. 539, 143
N. E. 274 (1923) ; One and Three S. William Street Bldg. Corp. v. Gardens Corp.,
133 Misc. 790, 233 N. Y. Supp. 473 (Sup. Ct. 1929) ; Wirty v. Nestos, 51 N. D. 463,
200 N. W. 524 (1924) ; Aronowitz v. Industrial Utilities Corp., 5 D. & C. 633 (Pa.
1924).
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may demand a declaratory judgment in their favor. But the second
sentence of the dictum is even more surprising. Would it really be
possible for the United States Supreme Court to refuse to pass upon
the constitutionality of a state statute or upon any other issue involving
a federal right if the case had been begun in the state court under de-
claratory-judgment procedure? Adherence to such a position might
make the decision of a state court on a federal constitutional question
final. The dictum has led one commentator to remark that a plaintiff
could prevent the removal of his case from a state to a federal court or
prevent Supreme Court review by suing in the state court for a declara-
tory judgment.8 9 Could it present a justiciable federal question if begun
by injunction, but no justiciable federal question if begun by declara-
tory action? In view of the fact that twenty-six states have now adopted
the declaratory-judgment procedure, it would seem highly probable that
the question will be squarely presented at some time, thus giving the
Supreme Court an opportunity to reconsider this dictum.
That the Supreme Court appears to attribute to the Liberty Ware-
house cases, as well as to the case of Willing v. Chicago Auditorium As-
sociation,9 0 a variety of meanings, none of which has any proper relation
to the declaratory judgment, would seem to follow from the fact that these
cases are cited in support of the proposition that the court will not ren-
der advisory opinions,91 or decide moot cases, 9 2 or pass on conclusions
of an administrative body.9 3 Obviously, it is not a proper exercise of
judicial power for a court to render advisory opinions, 4 and the action
'Note (1927) 100 CENT. L. J. 95.
'277 U. S. 274, 48 Sup. Ct. 507 (1928).
"Fidelity National Bank & Trust Co. v. Swope, 274 U. S. 123, 131, 47 Sup.
Ct. 511 (1927) ; Ex parte Bakelite Corp., 279 U. S. 438, 454, 49 Sup. Ct. 411 (1929)
("a duty to give decisions which are advisory only, and so without force as judicial
judgments, may be laid on a legislative court, but not on a constitutional court
established under Art. III"). Said the Pennsylvania Supreme Court in Ii re
Cryan's Estate, 152 At. 675, 677 (1930) : "Showing the extreme view taken by
some jurisdictions on the point in hand, all indications to date from the federal
courts are that they cannot conceive of declaratory judgments as other than ad-
visory judgments [opinions?] and therefore unconstitutional."
' Barker Painting Co. v. Local No. 734, 281 U. S. 462, 50 Sup. Ct. 356 (1930),
by Holmes, J., in which it is said, citing the Willing case as authority, that a court
"cannot be required to go into general propositions or prophetic statements of how
it is likely to act upon other possible or even probable issues that have not yet
arisen."
I In Federal Radio Commission v. General Electric Co., 281 U. S. 464, 50 Sup.
Ct. 389 (1930), the Supreme Court (by Van Devanter, J.) cites the Liberty Ware-
house and the Willing cases to the proposition that "the court cannot give decisions
which are merely advisory" or exercise "functions which are essentially legislative
or administrative."
' See Pelham v. Rose, 9 Wall. 103 (1869). By constitution in Massachusetts,
Maine, New Hampshire, Rhode Island, Florida, Colorado, and South Dakota, and
by legislation in Oklahoma, Vermont, Minnesota, Delaware, and Alabama, the
legislature or executive, with various limitations, may request an advisory opinion
from the Supreme Court of the State. See Ellingwood, Departmcntal Co-operation
in State Govermnent, New York, 1918; Clovis and Updegraff, Advisory Opinionis,
(1928) 13 IowA L. Rtv. 188.
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for a declaratory judgment cannot be employed to such an end. That
would be the result of a purported decision where there is an absence of
adverse parties, or insufficiency of necessary parties defendant, or
where the plaintiff lacks the necessary interest to sue, or where the con-
troversy is otherwise not ripe for decision.95 Nor are abstract, hypothet-
ical, academic, fictitious or dead issues-i.e., moot cases-determinable
either by the Supreme Court"6 or by any other court, 97 under or outside
the procedure for a declaratory judgment.
On the other hand, the Supreme Court has made "binding declara-
tions of right" without further relief, in a considerable number of cases. A
common example is the decision determining the location of a disputed but
existing boundary in suits between states.98 In La Abra Silver Mining
Co. v. United States,99 an action was brought by the United States, un-
der statutory authority, for a judicial declaration that an award made by
the Mexican-American Arbitral Tribunal in favor of the La Abra Com-
pany, an American corporation, had been obtained by fraud. No conse-
quential relief was asked, and necessarily none could be given, for the
money awarded was in the hands of the Secretary of State awaiting dis-
tribution. In United States v. Jones,100 the appellate jurisdiction of the
court was held to extend to a judgment of the Court of Claims, which
was no longer subject to revision by the Secretary of the Treasury, but
'Hayden Plan Co. v. Friedlander, 97 Cal. App. 12, 275 Pac. 253 (1929);
Gabriel v. Board of Regents of University of Colorado, 83 Colo. 582, 267 Pac. 407(1928) ; Denver v. Denver Land Co., 85 Colo. 198, 274 Pac. 743 (1929) ; Weigand
v. Board of Commissioners of Wichita, 118 Kan. 265, 234 Pac. 978 (1925) ; Purity
Oats Co. v. State et al., 125 Kan. 558, 264 Pac. 740 (1928) ; Dietz v. Zimmer, 231
Ky. 546, 21 S. W. (2d) 999 (1929) ; Reese v. Adamson, 297 Pa. 13, 146 Atl. 262(1929) ; In re City of Pittsburgh's City Charter, 297 Pa. 502, 147 Atl. 525 (1929).
Singer Mfg. Co. v. Wright, 141 U. S. 696, 12 Sup. Ct. 103 (1891) (suit to
restrain collection of taxes which were paid pending appeal) ; Mills v. Green, 159
U. S. 651, 16 Sup. Ct. 132 (1895) (suit to be registered as voter at election which
had already been held) ; Commercial Cable Co. v. Burleson, 250 U. S. 360, 39 Sup.
Ct. 512 (1919) (suit to restrain taking of cable lines which had been returned at
time of appeal); United States v. Alaska Steamship Co., 253 U. S. 113, 40 Sup.
Ct. 448 (1920) (subsequent legislation repealed statute which was contested as
unconstitutional) ; Dakota Coal Co. v. Fraser, 267 Fed. 130 (C. C. A. 8th, 1920)(suit for coal mines which had already been returned to owner). The ground for
declining this jurisdiction is the common law principle that courts do not propound
law i thesi. See Atherton Mills v. Johnston, 259 U. S. 13, 42 Sup. Ct. 422 (1922).
' See especially Revis v. Daugherty, 215 Ky. 823, 287 S. W. 28 (1926) ; Ladner
v. Siegel, 294 Pa. 368, 144 Atl. 274 (1928) ; Wagner v. County of Somerset, 96
Pa. Super. Ct. 434 (1929) ; Duff's Estate, 4 D. & C. 315 (Pa. 1924) ; Brumagin's
Petition, 6 D. & C. 431 (Pa. 1925).
' Louisiana v. M ississppi, 202 U. S. 1, 26 Sup. Ct. 408 (1906); Arkansas v.
Tennessee, 246 U. S. 158, 38 Sup. Ct. 301 (1918) ; Georgia v. South Carolina, 257
U. S. 516, 42 Sup. Ct. 173 (1922) ; Oklahoma v. Texas, 272 U. S. 21, 47 Sup. Ct. 9(1926) ("original suit brought by Oklahoma against Texas, to establish their
boundary on the Red River").
' 175 U. S. 423, 20 Sup. Ct. 168 (1899). It was held that this constituted a
"4case"
" 119 U. S. 477, 7 Sup. Ct. 283 (1886).
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was final on the merits, although necessarily the court had no power to
enforce.its decision by writ of execution. In Gaines v. Fuentes,10 1 a
suit was brought to declare void a certain will, as well as to set aside the
decree admitting it to probate. In Smith v. Adams,10 2 a proceeding was
brought in the territorial court of Dakota to pass upon an election for
and to declare the location of a county seat. In Southern Pacific Ter-
minal Co. v. Interstate Coinimerce Commission,10 3 the legality of an order
of the Interstate Commerce Commission was passed upon, although it
had expired before the date of judgment, on the ground that important
public interests involving the power of the Commission were involved.
In Sharon v. Tucker,20 4 the court sustained a bill to declare valid the
title of a holder of real estate by adverse possession against a record
holder whose title had become unenforceable by the running of the
statute of limitations. In Fidelity National Bank & Trust Co. v.
Swope,10 5 an action was brought by the holder of certificates constituting
a lien for public improvements to have the certificates and the statutory
proceedings for the improvements declared valid. All these cases were
deemed to constitute cases and controversies in a constitutional sense.
10
10192 U. S. 10 (1875).
130 U. S. 167, 9 Sup. Ct. 566 (1889).
'°219 U. S. 498, 515, 31 Sup. Ct. 279, 283 (1911). The case might have been
deemed moot, as in the criminal appeal after acquittal [United States v. Evans,
213 U. S. 297, 29 Sup. Ct. 507 (1909)], had the court not wished to decide the
case. They thought it important to decide the question, as a matter of public
interest, hence disregarded the fact that, in the particular case before the court,
the Commissioner's order had expired. The court relied on United States v. Trans-
Missouri Freight Ass'n, 166 U. S. 290, 308, 17 Sup. Ct. 540 (1897), and Boise City
Irr. & Land Co. v. Clark, 131 Fed. 415 (C. C. A. 9th, 1904), and distinguished
Jones v. Montague, 194 U. S. 147, 24 Sup. Ct. 611 (1904), and Richardson v.
McChesney, 218 U. S. 487, 31 Sup. Ct. 43 (1910), on the ground that the change
of circumstances there would have made any judgment ineffective. The distinction
seems not convincing.
104 144 U. S. 533, 12 Sup. Ct. 720 (1892). Field, J., for the court, says (at
548): "The flexibility of decrees of a court of equity will enable it to meet
every emergency. Here the embarrassment to the complainants in the use and en-
joyment of their property are obvious and insuperable except by relief through that
court. No existing rights of the defendants will be impaired by granting what is
prayed, and the rights of the complainants will be placed in a condition to be
available. The same principle which leads a court of equity upon proper proof to
establish by its decree the existence of a lost deed, and thus make it a matter of
record, must justify it upon like proof to declare by its decree the validity of a
title resting in the recollection of witnesses, and thus make the evidence of the title
a matter of record." Inasmuch as Field, J., stated that the plaintiff's title had
not been controverted or assailed by the defendants, the injunction in the decree
restraining the defendant from asserting title must be deemed purely perfunctory.
It was necessarily ancillary to the adjudication or declaration that he had no title.
It is unusual to enjoin acts which have not even been threatened. See also Bolart
v. Chamberlain, 99 Mo. 622, 631, 13 S. W. 85 (1890) ; Hord v. Baugh, 7 Humph.
576, 578 (Tenn. 1847) ; Montgomery v. Kerr, 6 Cold. 199 (Tenn. 1869).
' 274 U. S. 123, 47 Sup. Ct. 511 (1927).
... Other recent judgments of the Supreme Court, which are in effect declara-
tory, are, among others, the following: 1. Marlin v. Lewallen, 276 U. S. 58, 48
Sup. Ct. 248 (1928) (action for a judgment declaring that plaintiff as surviving
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Willing v. Chicago Auditorium Association10 7 presented the most
interesting case of the four before the Supreme Court. The Chicago
Auditorium Association held as lessees valuable 99- and 198-year ground
husband of Creek Indian was entitled to an estate in curtesy in her land. Claim
denied). Cf. declarations in Armes v. Russell & Schwartz, 33 B. C. 303 (Can.
1923) ; Mackenzie v. Lady Mary Hanbury, 8 D. 964 (Scotland, 1846). 2. Liberty
Nat. Bank of Roanoke v. Bear, 276 U. S. 215, 48 Sup. Ct. 252 (1928) (action by
a judgment creditor against trustee in bankruptcy for a judgment declaring that
his judgment lien was not annulled by subsequent bankruptcy. So held). Cf. de-
clarations in lit re David Allester, Ltd., [1922] 2 Ch. 211; lt re Hamilton, [1924]
N. Z. 386; Sadler v. Auckland Co-op. Society, [1926] N. Z. 84. 3. Miller v.
Schoene, 276 U. S. 272, 48 Sup. Ct. 246 (1928) (action for a judgment declaring
invalid an order of state entomologist to cut down plaintiff's cedar trees. Order
held valid). Cf. declaration in Ellis v. Chairman, etc., of the Hutt County, 29
N. Z. 588 (1910) (validity of order to remove dam). 4. Larkin v. Paugh, 276 U. S.
431, 48 Sup. Ct. 366 (1928) (action for a judgment declaring that plaintiff's title
under deed from the heirs was superior to defendant's title under deed from ad-
ministrator). Cf. declarations in McCormick v. Allen, 39 C. L. R. 22 (Australia,
1926) ; Allen v. Smellie, 31 N. Z. 305 (1911) ; Karepa v. Saunders, [1930] N. Z.
242. 5. Jenkins v. National Surety Co., 277 U. S. 258, 48 Sup. Ct. 445 (1928)
(action by a surety against receiver in bankruptcy for judgment declaring surety
entitled to participate in certain surplus funds). Cf. declarations in In re Fraser
and Chalmers, [1919) 2 Ch. 115; In re Lamplugh Iron Co., [1927] 1 Ch. 308. 6.
Kinney-Coastal Oil Co. v. Kieffer, 277 U. S. 488, 48 Sup. Ct. 580 (1928) (action
by lessee of oil and gas lease against patentee of same land under homestead forjudgment declaring the platting of lots for sale by latter a violation of leasing
rights of former, plus injunction). Cf. declarations in Lloyd Jones v. Clark-
Jones, [1919]. 1 Ch. 424; Commonwealth v. New South Wales, 33 C. L. R. 1
(Australia, 1923). 7. Nielsen v. Johnson, 279 U. S. 47, 49 Sup. Ct. 223 (1929)
(action by administrator against state treasurer for judgment declaring that tax
assessment on decedent's estate was void as contrary to a treaty. So held). Cf.
declarations in Wellington Harbour Board v. Union Steamship Co., 32 N. Z. 766
(1913) ; Napier Borough v. Hawke's Bay Education Board, [1924] N. Z. 596. 8.
Flink v. Paladini, 279 U. S. 59, 49 Sup. Ct. 255 (1929) (proceeding for judgment
declaring petitioners subject to limited liability only). Cf. declarations in It re
Schneideman Bros., [1917] N. Z. 48; Husheer v. New Zealand Tobacco Co.,[1921] N. Z. 304. 9. County of Spokane, Washington v. United States, 279 U. S.
80, 49 Sap. Ct. 321 (1929) (action by U. S. Commissioner of Internal Revenue
against County Treasurer for judgment declaring that United States has priority.
over County in distribution of insolvent's funds in hands of receiver). Cf. dec-
larations in Burn v. The Company, [1924] 1 Ch. 550; Tasman Fruit-Packing Ass'n
v. The King, [1927] N. Z. 518. 10. Ex parte Worcester County Nat. Bank, 279
U. S. 347, 49 Sup. Ct. 368 (1929) (petition for a decree declaring plaintiff national
bank, as successor to state trust company, privileged to present accounts as exec-
utor of decedent's estate. Denied). Cf. declaration of succession in Bodell v.
William Cable & Co., [1921] N. Z. 211. 11. United States v. Jackson, 280 U. S.
183, 50 Sup. Ct. 143 (1930) (action to quiet title to land deeded by Indian allottee
to one R. and declaring R. the owner). Cf. declarations in Harris v. Jenkins, 31
C. L. R. 341 (Australia, 1922); Maynard v. Goode, 37 C. L. R. 529 (Australia,
1926). 12. Wabash Ry. Co. v. Barclay, 280 U. S. 197, 201, 50 Sup. Ct. 106 (1930)
(by Holmes, J. : "This is a bill by holders of first preferred stock . . . to have it
declared that holders of such stock are entitled to receive preferential dividends u
to five per cent . .. before any dividends are paid upon other stock; and that tl*
company may be enjoined from paying dividends upon ... stock unless it shall
first have paid such preferential dividends ... ." Preference denied). Cf. declara-
tions in Anglo-French Music Co. v. Nicoll, [1921] 1 Ch. 386; First Garden City,
Ltd. v. Bonham-Carter, [1928] 1 Ch. 53. 13. United States v. Guaranty Trust Co.,
280 U. S. 478, 50 Sup. Ct. 212 (1930) (action to establish priority of United States
over other creditors of insolvent estate. Denied). Cf. declarations as to preference
and priority supra.
" Supra note 90.
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leases. The Auditorium, however, is an antiquated building, whose low
rental and unavailability for modem use had prevented payment of div-
idends to the stockholders. The lessees, therefore, took preliminary
steps to tear down the building and put up a great modern structure
which would be profitable. Bankers offered to advance the necessary
funds if demolition was permissible. The terms of the leases, however,
left it uncertain whether the old building could be torn down without
the landlords' consent. The landlords, seeing an opportunity to force
either a higher rental or a cash bonus or a forfeiture of the ground
lease, denied their consent to the destruction of the building,10 8 though it
might be supposed that ordinarily landlords would be pleased at the sub-
stitution of a modem, for an old, building. The lessees believed them-
selves privileged under the lease to demolish the building without con-
sent, but, fearing the forfeiture of the lease if they acted on their own
interpretation of their rights, they brought an action in an Illinois court,
which non-resident defendants caused to be transferred to the federal
court, for the removal of what they alleged was a cloud on their title
created by the landlords' refusal of consent. The landlords filed answers
alleging that the destruction of the building would constitute waste, a
ground of forfeiture, and a violation of the leases. The United States
district court dismissed the bill,' 0 9 but the circuit court of appeals re-
versed,-"0 holding that the issue, involving millions, was so important,
"An issue was raised as to whether the tenant's claim had in fact been dis-
puted, the lessors' attorneys and even the Supreme Court believing that there had
merely been a friendly verbal difference of opinion as to the lessee's rights under
the lease. There seems to be some confusion in the Supreme Court's opinion as to
the effect of the oral statements. They are deemed not sufficient to copstitute a
cloud on title, but they apparently may be sufficient to constitute an adverse claim.
That should suffice to create a controversy. No discussions were necessary, it is sub-
mitted, to create a controversy between the parties. Their hostile controversy is de-
terminable from the record. That the defendants disputed the plaintiff's claim is
manifest from their answers (Record 169 and 182) : "The present building cannot
be removed without a violation of the terms, covenants, and conditions of the leases";
again "the defendants aver that, if plaintiff destroys the present improvement,
whether for the purpose of erecting a new one or otherwise, such destruction will
constitute waste, and will give the owners of the land . . . the right to re-enter
... free from any and all claims or rights of plaintiff." The assertion of a claim
contrary to that of the plaintiff would seem to create a controverted issue in the
clearest sense: Blair v. Chicago, 201 U. S. 400, 26 Sup. Ct. 427 (1906) ; Pennsyl-
vania v. West Virginia, 262 U. S. 553, 591, 43 Sup. Ct. 658 (1923) : "The com-
plainant state asserts and the defendant state denies that such a withdrawal [of
natural gas under a statute not yet enforced] is an interference with interstate coin-
merce .... This is essentially a judicial question. Bedford-Bowling Green Stone
Co. v. Oman, 134 Fed. 441 (C. C. W. D. Ky. 1904); Vaca Val. & C. L. R. Co. v.
Mansfield, 84 Cal. 560, 24 Pac. 145 (1890) ; Brown v. Cox, 158 Ind. 364, 68 N. E.
568 (1902) ; 12 Cyc. of Evid. 608.
"Chicago Auditorium Ass'n v. Cramer, 8 F. (2d) 998 (N. D. Ill. 1925).
... Chicago Auditorium Ass'n v. Willing, 20 F.(2d) 837 (C. C. A. 7th, 1927).
The court said: "True, this court cannot make contracts for the parties. It
cannot remake leases for competent parties who have contracted. But it can, and
does, say that plaintiff's remedy at law is not adequate when it must stake its en-
tire investment-risk loss of its leasehold, perhaps-as a condition upon which
it may judicially ascertain its legal rights."
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and the necessity of removing the doubt or cloud so great, that they
would consider the action a proper proceeding for the removal of a
cloud from title.'11 The commentators approved this conclusion,"12
The United States Supreme Court reversed this judgment on the
ground that since the question concerning the plaintiff's right arose only
on the face of the leases by which it derived title, was not in legal con-
templation a cloud; hence a bill to remove it would not lie-all that it
was necessary to say."1 3 Justice Brandeis went on to remark, however,
that "what the plaintiff seeks is simply 'a declaratory judgment." Under
the Illinois and federal practice, the plaintiff could not as yet demand
such a judgment,"14 but the Justice added, somewhat ambiguously, "To
grant that relief is beyond the power conferred upon the federal judi-
ciary." Liberty Warehouse Co. v. Grannis is cited as authority.
Mr. Justice Stone, in a concurring opinion, objected to the pro-
priety of any expression concerning the declaratory judgment or its
constitutionality. He said:
"I concur in the result. It suffices to say that the suit is plainly not one
within the equity jurisdiction conferred by §§ 24,28, of the Judicial Code. But
it is unnecessary, and I am therefore not prepared, to go further and say any-
thing in support of the view that Congress may not constitutionally confer on
the federal courts jurisdicition to render declaratory judgments in cases where
that form of judgment would be an appropriate remedy, or that this Court is
without constitutional power to review such judgments of state courts when
they involve a federal question. Compare Fidelity National Bank & Trust Co.
v. Swope, 274 U. S. 123, 130-134. 'It is not the habit of the court to decide
questions of a constitutional nature unless absolutely necessary to a decision of
the case.' Burton v. United States, 196 U. S. 283, 295. See Blair v. United
States, 250 U. S. 273, 279; Flint v. Stone Tracy Co., 220 U. S. 107, 177; Light
v. United States, 220 U. S. 523, 538. There is certainly no 'case or con-
troversy' before us requiring an opinion on the power of Congress to incorpo-
rate the declaratory judgment into our federal jurisprudence. And the deter-
mination now made seems to me very similar itself to a declaratory.. judgment
to the effect that we could not constitutionally be authorized to give such judg-
" A similar liberal view, doubtless forced by the necessity of deciding an
otherwise undeterminable question and relieving an intolerable situation, was taken
in McArthur v. Hood Co., 221 Mass. 372, 109 N. E. 162 (1915); and Rector v.
Rector, 201 N. Y. 1, 94 N. E. 191 (1911). 6
' (1927) 1 CiN. L. REv. 488; Note (1927) 13 CORN. L. Q. 117; (1927) 41
HAiv. L. Rnv. 104; (1928) 26 MicH. L. REv. 426; (1927) 76 U. oF" PA. L. REv.217.
1 277 U. S. at 288, 48 Sup. Ct. at 509. Prof. Langmaid thinks the court has
itself departed from the test, that there is no cloud when the invalidity is apparent
on the face of the instrument; see Langmaid (1929) 23 ILL. L. REv. 595, 597, 598.
" Illinois has not passed a declaratory judgment statute. A proposed federal
Act passed the House of Representatives Jan. 25, 1928 (H. R. 5623. 70th Cong., 1st
sess.). It has not yet passed the Senate, though extensive hearings have been held.
See Hearings on H. R. 5623, 70th Cong., 1st sess., April 27 and May 18, 1928,
Judiciary Committee. 81 pp.
SProbably "moot" or "advisory" or "dictum" would have been preferable.
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ments-but is, in addition, prospective, unasked, and unauthorized under any
statute.".
The issue before the court required no discussion of the declaratory
judgment, nor did that form of procedure receive special attention in
argument.ll' Any discussion of its constitutionality was irrelevant to
the case. If the court meant that Congress had not yet conferred the
power on the federal courts, the conclusion was correct. If the court
meant that the federal courts could not constitutionally be given by
Congress the power to render declaratory judgments, it is believed that
the conclusion was gratuitous. The decision makes no reference to any
of the hundreds of decisions since 1883 in nearly every English-speak-
ing jurisdictios discussing every phase of the declaratory judgment, in-
cluding the constitutional issues, nor to the voluminous literature on the
subject in the United States. Interesting remarks are made as to what
the declaratory judgment is and is not. Justice Brandeis points out, for
example, that the case is not a moot case or an administrative, question;
that it would in form come under a familiar head of equity jurisdiction;
that a final judgment could be given; that the parties are adverse in
interest; that the plaintiff has a substantial, definite, and specific interest
in the question; that it does not involve an attempt to secure an abstract
determination by the court of the validity of a statute.
It is believed that the court here stated every ground to prove that
the issue constituted a "case" or "controversy" between adverse parties,
and that it could have been decided in an authorized action for a de-
claratory judgment."18 Why, then, was not this a "case" or "contro-
versy"? Because, it is alleged, "the plaintiff's desires are thwarted by
its own doubts or by the fears of others"; because, "in the course of an
informal friendly private conversation," Willing had advised the lessee
"'The commentators seems to agree that, so far as concerns the remarks on
a declaratory judgment's not constituting a "case!' or "controversy," the majority
are wrong and Justice Stone correct. Grinnell, op. cit. supra note 64; Langmaid, op.
cit. supra note 113; (1928) 14 A. B. A. J. 633; Note (1928) 41 HAv. L. REv. 232;
Note (1930) 43 HARV. L. REv. 1290; Note (1928) 38 YALE L. J. 104.
' The plaintiffs merely denied they were seeking a declaratory judgment,
whereas the defendants maintained that the decree sought could be nothing but that.
The defendants' brief asserts that the grant of plaintiffs' petition would be "open-
ing the doorway of federal equity jurisprudence to the forbidden declaratory
judgment." Plaintiffs had joined a prayer for an injunction to restrain interference
with their demolition of the building, but on this neither side made any argument
and the court does not mention it. While equity might have granted the relief
sought, as the Circuit Court held, Justice Brandeis is correct in characterizing it
as a declaratory judgment. So are most decrees in bills quia timnet, bills of peace,
interpleader, and quieting title.
' See the almost identical case of Washington-Detroit Theater Co. v. Moore,
supra note 13, and the analogous cases of Woodward v. Fox West Coast Theaters,
284 Pac. 350 (Ariz. 1930) ; Girard Trust Co. v. Tremblay Motor Co., 291 Pa. 507,
140 Atl. 506 (1928).
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"that the lessee had no right to tear the building down" without the
landlord's consent, and because "mere refusal by a landlord to agree
with the tenant as to the meaning of a lease, his mere failure to remove
obstacles to the fulfillment of the tenant's desires, is not an actionable
wrong" and that the defendant
"had done nothing which hampered the full enjoyment of the present use and
occupancy of the demised premises .... There was neither hostile act nor a
threat. There is no evidence of a claim of any kind made by any defendant,
except the expression by Willing, in an amicable private conversation, of an
opinion on a question of law."
Possibly this is designed to show that there was no contested issue'
between the parties, but a mere academic difference of opinion on a ques-
tion of law. But why refer to friendly conversations when the plead-
ings show a most hostile and adverse position? No preliminary conver-
sation or statement of position would seem to be required by the law as
a condition of bringing an action. An order to show cause requires
no preliminary consultation with the defendant. Had the cloud con-
sisted of a record independently of the lease itself, the action would
doubtless have been deemed a proper proceeding. "Mere refusal" to
grant consent under a lease vhich requires it, would seem to be all the
"actionable wrong" that any one could ask, for millions of dollars were
placed in jeopardy by that adverse and hostile position. If the law had
known an action to compel consent, this would doubtless have consti-
tuted a "case" or "controversy." The term "actionable wrong" seems
a little antiquated, reverting to a time when the law courts were deemed
only an agency to remedy wrong-doing. The equitable growth of the
preventive and declaratory functions of judicial power exercised by
Anglo-Saxon courts for centuries and referred to above, should not
have passed unnoticed. In these cases there is no "hostile act or a
threat," but a controversy as to legal rights, which urgently requires set-
tlement.'10  What more should any court ask? Why should the Su-
"
1 In Terrace v. Thompson, 263 U. S. 197, 44 Sup. Ct. 15 (1923) ; Pierce v.
Society of Sisters, 268 U. S. 510, 45 Sup. Ct. 571 (1925) ; Village of Euclid v.Ambler Realty Co., 272 U. S. 365, 47 Sup. Ct. 114 (1926), there was no wrong or
threat of wrong. A statute or ordinance not yet in force or applied endangered the
plaintiff's freedom of action or peace of mind or interests, and the court saw in
this danger or uncertainty an adequate ground for an adjudication or declaration
of plaintiff's rights, using the injunction proceeding as a bare form. In these
cases, the plaintiff's desires to conclude a lease (Terrace v. Thompson), to operate
a parochial school (Pierce v. Society of Sisters), to use its property without zoning
restriction (Village of Euclid v. Ambler Realty Co.), were "thwarted by its own
doubts," for which reason they summoned a cdntesting defendant into court and
thus presented an issue for judicial determination. Said Butler, J., for the court,
in Terrace v. Thompson, 263 U. S. at 216: "They are not obliged to take the
risk of prosecution, fines and imprisonment and loss of property in order to secure
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preme Court ask for more violence as a condition of a justiciable issue
than is demanded by the courts of England, Scotland, or other common-
an adjudication of their rights." (It is true that Judge Brandeis dissented in Ter-
race v. Thompson and in Pennsylvania v. West Virginia, believing the issue non-
justiciable.) Actions brought to establish the validity, hence the marketability of
title-including realty, personalty, and especially municipal bonds-are cases where
"the plaintiff's desires are thwarted by its own doubts or by the fears of others."
Fidelity National Bank & Trust Co. v. Swope, 274 U. S. 123, 47 Sup. Ct. 511
(1927) ; Kentucky v. Indiana, 281 U. S. 163, 50 Sup. Ct. 275 (1930) (defendant's
doubts and fears of others); In re Kariher's Petition, 284 Pa. 455, 131 Att. 265
(1925); Miller v. Miller, 149 Tenn. 463, 261 S. W. 965 (1924). In trustees'
bills for instructions, in actions to declare invalid transactions (e.g., marriages,
divorces, etc.) or instruments (e.g., notes, deeds, wills, etc.), "no defendant
has wronged the plaintiff or has threatened to do so." It is a fact, an event,
a record which creates uncertainty or jeopardy for the plaintiff, and the law
affords judicial protection to the endangered or doubtful right by clarification
and preservation. See Cohen v. New York Mutual L. I. Co., 50 N. Y. 610
(1872). The jurisdiction to relieve owners of real property from vexatious
claims or even of grounds for possible future claims is inherent in equity. Sharon
v. Tucker, 144 U. S. 533, 12 Sup. Ct. 720 (1892) ; Howard, Bills to Remove Cloud
from Title (1918) 25 W. VA. L. Q. 109. Justice Field has pointed out that in
actions to quiet title it was not necessary that such title should have been con-
troverted or assailed. Sharon v. Tucker, 144 U. S. at 543, 12 Sup. Ct. at 722.
For the very raison d'etre of such actions has always been to protect the property
owner from depreciation in value due to the existence of adverse claims not then
being presented in such manner as to furnish ground for an action at law. Hol-
land v. Challen, 110 U. S. 15, 3 Sup. Ct. 495 (1884). Such conditions to the ex-
ercise of this jurisdiction as have from time to time been prescribed by the courts
[Devine v. Los Angeles, 202 U. S. 313, 26 Sup. Ct. at 652 (1906) ; Boise Artesian
Hot & Cold Water Co. v. Boise City, 213 U. S. 276, 29 Sup. Ct. 426 (1909) ; but
cf. Blair v. Chicago, 201 U. S. 400, 26 Sup. Ct. 427 (1906)] may be dispensed
with by the legislature without thereby enlarging the jurisdiction of equity. Case
of Broderick's Will, 21 Wall. 503 (U. S. 1874) ; Holland v. Challen, supra;
Bardon v. Land & River Impr. Co., 157 U. S. 327, 15 Sup. Ct. 650 (1895). Thus
the action for the construction of a will has been extended by statute to deeds and
other written instruments, where no other relief is given [In re Ungaro's Will, 88
N. J. Eq. 25, 102 Atl. 244 (1917). The court regards this statute as effecting an
extension of the remedy rather than of jurisdiction], and where no questions of
trust are involved. Barton v. Barton, 283 Ill. 338, 119 N. E. 320 (1918) ; ILL. REV.
STAT. (Cahill, 1927) c. 22, § 50. A Connecticut statute has provided for an action
by any claimant of an interest in real or personal property against any adverse
claimant to determine such adverse claim and quiet title. Ackerman v. Union &
New Haven Trust Co., 91 Conn. 500, 100 Atl. 22 (1917); CoNN. GEN. STAT.(1918) § 5113. A Minnesota statute permits the holder of a fee title to bring an
action against the holder of a tax title to determine such claim without, as was
formerly necessary, paying into court the amount for which the land was sold at
the tax sale. Deaver v. Napier, 139 Minn. 219, 166 N. W. 187 (1918); MiNN.
STAT. (Mason, 1927) c. 82, § 9556. There is also the equitable action to establish
and confirm title in the case of lost records and under other circumstances. ILL.
REv. STAT. (Cahill, 1927) c. 116, § 16. There is the action by which an equitable
claimant may obtain a judgment impressing a trust upon the legal title in his favor
[Donahoe v. Rogers, 168 Cal. 700, 144 Pac. 958 (1914) ; Porten v. Peterson, 139
Minn. 152, 166 N. W. 183 (1918)], and the action to declare a supposed trust in-
valid. Scheibner v. Scheibner, 199 Mich. 630, 165 N. W. 660 (1917). There are
actions to affirm the validity of a marriage denied or doubted by the other party.
Kitzman v. Kitzman, 167 Wis. 308, 166 N. W. 789 (1918); Wis. STAT. (1927)
§ 247.03. Where new equitable rights have been thus created in the states by statu-
tory extensions of existing remedies, the federal courts have occasionally given
them effect. Bardon v. Land & River Impr. Co., supra. But cf. Wehrman v.
Conldin, 155 U. S. 314, 15 Sup. Ct. 129 (1894), as to how far such statutes conflict
with the constitutional provision entitling parties to a trial by jury. When our
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law jurisdictions? In England, the courts demand that an issue pre-
sented for decision shall involve a cause of action. It would seem
hardly possible that a procedure which in England was established by
mere rule of court and has been employed in hundreds of cases consti-
tuting "causes of action" is incapable of adoption in the federal courts by
congressional legislation, but would require an amendment to the Con-
stitution.
But even if it were true that this was a "friendly" doubt or dif-
ference, that would by no means justify the generalizations as to de-
claratory judgments deduced by Justice Brandeis. The argument seems
to be: Cases presenting merely a "friendly" doubt or difference are non-
justiciable under the Constitution; every action for a declaratory judg-
ment presents merely a friendly doubt or difference; hence every action
for a declaratory judgment is non-justiciable under the Constitution.
Mere statement demonstrates, it is believed, the unsustainability of this
supposed syllogism. Yet it appears to have escaped criticism from
every member of the court except Justice Stone. If the difference
were only "friendly" or academic, and thus presumably not ripe for
judicial decision, it would have been a moot case,12 0 and on that ground
inappropriate for decision, whether by declaratory judgment or any
other judgment. It could not have involved a "friendly" doubt without
constituting a moot case; yet the court admits that the issue is "not
moot." Had it been a "friendly" doubt or academic issue only, it could
not have eventuated in a declaratory judgment. By suggesting the de-
claratory judgment as the plaintiff's goal, the court must necessarily
assume an adversary proceeding involving a justiciable issue. Thus the
minor premise of the court's implied syllogism contains within itself a
contradiction which destroys the validity of the whole reasoning. The
fact is, it is respectfully submitted, that the issue was not "friendly"
or academic, but a hostile litigation involving important pecuniary rights.
Under a resourceful legal system, the plaintiff should have been able to
get a judgment on the issue, which, the court correctly conGludes, would
have been declaratory, like many approved judgments. But there was
no warrant for casting unjustifiable aspersions upon the declaratory
courts are daily adjudicating such suits on their merits, can it be questioned that
cases or controversies are therein presented? In so far as no other relief is
awarded, these are in effect declaratory judgments. The declaratory action is thus
merely a new name for a form of remedy long known to English and American
practice. See cases cited in Langmaid, op. cit. supra note 113, at 603 et seq., in
which it is made clear that not merely the redress of wrongs or prevention of
threatened wrongs, but the preservation and protection of existing rights is an im-
portant function of courts, particularly of equity. Cf. Terrace v. Thompson, supra.
" Jones v. Montague, 194 U. S. 147, 24 Sup. Ct. 611 (1904) ; Richardson v.
McChesney, 218 U. S. 487, 31 Sup. Ct. 43 (1910) ; Ex parte Steele, 162 Fed. 694,
701 (N. D. Ala. 1908).
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judgment as a form of procedure, by labelling the issue as "friendly"
or as involving a mere doubt or by suggesting that the issue was not
justiciaMe and then implying that declaratory judgments are designed
for the decision of non-justiciable issues. It bad not occurred to either
of the lower courts that the bitter coiutest involved in the instant case
was not a "controversy" involving great stakes.121 What the Supreme
Court, in effect, does is to tell the plaintiff that he must tear down the
building at the risk of forfeiting the leases and incurring damages, in
order to obtain an adjudication of his right to do so. 122
The confession of judicial impotence implied in the court's in-
ability to decide whether the lease did or did not empower the lessee to
demolish the. Auditorium and erect a new building is of itself, it is sub-
mitted, an indictment of a remedial system which necessitates such an
awkward, baffling, and anti-social result, and at the same time a convinc-
ing argument for the introduction into the federal and every other
jurisdictibn of the declaratory judgment.
What would seem to have occurred is a confusion between the con-
stitutional jurisdiction of the federal courts and the procedural rule-
making power of Congress. A similar question was before the Eng-
lish Court of Appeal in the case of Guaranty Trust Co. v. Hannay,
123
in which the distinction between jurisdiction and procedure was ex-
amined at length by Pickford, L. J.124  It seems unfortunate that this
'The defendants' brief speaks of "the substance of the controversy," and
"what is the controversy." The difference between the declaratory judgment and
the moot case is elementary and has been discussed supra notes 96 and 97.
'Yet in Terrace v. Thompson, mrpra, where the parties were deterred from
entering into a proposed lease of agricultural land in Washington by fear of a
criminal prosecution, the Supreme Court considered the issue justiciable and recog-
nized the necessity for a judgment, by saying: "They are not obliged to take the
risk of prosecution, fines and imprisonment and loss of property in order to secure
an adjudication of their rights."
[1915] 2 K. B. 536. The Guaranty Trust Co. sued for a declaration that it
was not liable to repay to Hannay & Co. certain sums which it had received from
Hannay on forged bills of lading.
"2 See note 64, supra. The term "jurisdiction" is slightly ambiguous. It con-
monly means what Pickford, L. J., states. But it may be observed that the action
for a declaration may be either an alternative remedy, that is, may lie under cir-
cumstances when other actions could also have been brought, or an exclusive remedy,
that is, may lie under circumstances where no other action is possible. It was ex-
clusive in Guaranty Trust Co. v. Hannay. Many actions for declarations, notably
for negative declarations, can thus be brought under circumstances where before
the statute or rule authorizing declaratory judgments, no action would have been
sustainable. Justiciability in these cases is created at a stage of the dispute prior
to that justifying an action for damages. In a sense, jurisdiction is thus extended,
but had the term been so narrowly understood, the Guaranty Trust case would have
been an appropriate vehicle for its expression. Instead, the common interpretation
of the term was presented. In either view, however, legislation may confer the
power to render declaratory judgments on the federal courts in cases over which
federal jurisdiction otherwise extends. POMEROY, EQUITY JURISPRUDENcE (4th ed.
1918) speaks of jurisdiction in two senses: (1) in the strict sense, as "the power
residing in such court to determine judicially a given action, controversy or ques-
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leading case, together with the innumerable cases involving the construc-
tion of leases under declaratory-judgment procedure, should have re-
mained unnoticed by Justice Brandeis.
Mr. Grinnell, in his article in the Massachusetts Law Quarterly
cited above, points out that the Rules of 1883 merely indicated a judi-
cial change of view as to the expediency of rendering declaratory judg-
ments. It in no way affected jurisdiction. If the legislature believes
such judgments to be expedient, it would seem hard for a court to say
that it interferes with its "jurisdiction." Mr. Grinnell suggests that the
situation in England seems to resemble the gradual extension of the
remedy of an action of assumpsit by judicial action with the fiction of
an implied promise in order that justice might be administered. It
would hardly be asserted that reforms in procedure are beyond the con-
stitutional power of Congress.12 5  Justice Brandeis himself has ably
pointed out that consequential relief or execution is not a neces-
sarily inherent part of a valid final judgment; and if certain declaratory
tion presented to it for decision" (at 153) ; (2) as "the power to hear certain kinds
and classes of civil cases according to the principles of the method and procedure
adopted by the Court of Chancery . . ." (at 156).
The use in Article 3 of the Constitution of the word "controversies" in contra-
distinction to the word "cases," and the omission of the word "all" in respect to
controversies, left it to Congress to define the controversies over which the courts
it was empowered to create and establish might exercise jurisdiction, and the man-
ner in which this was to be done. Stevenson v. Fain, 195 U. S. 165, 25 Sup. Ct. 6
(1904). Thus, Congress possesses the sole right to say what shall be the forms of
proceeding in the courts of the United States. Livingston v. Story, 9 Pet. 632(U. S. 1835) ; Ex parte New Orleans City Bank, 3 How. 292 (U. S. 1845). Un-
less matters of practice and procedure are to be confused with jurisdiction over
parties and subject-matter, the soundness of the dictum in the Chicago Auditorium
case should be gauged exclusively by the scope of the power of judging of the
federal courts-that is, the scope of the term "case" and "controversy." The Con-
stitution fixes the limits of federal jurisdiction over parties and subject-matter,
and an Act of Congress cannot extend it. Hodgson v. Bowerbank, 5 Cranch 303
(U. S. 1809); Dred Scott v. Sandford, 19 How. 393 (U. S. 1857).
"= The, supposed historical argument of Brandeis, J., conveying the inference
that only forms of procedure known in 1787 are 'permissible in the federal courts,
even if applicable to the action for a declaratory judgment, seems unsound. Forms
of remedy then known have been abolished and new forms authorized. See Ellis
v. Davis, 109 U. S. 485, 497, 3 Sup. Ct. 327 (1883), where the court said: "It has
often been decided by this Court that the terms 'law' and 'equity,' as used in the
Constitution, although intended to mark and fix the distinction between the two
systems of jurisprudence as known and practised at the time of its adoption, do not
restrict the jurisdiction conferred by it to the very rights and remedies then recog-
nized and employed, but embrace as well not only rights newly created by statutes
of the States . . . but new forms of remedies to be administered in the courts of
the United States, according to the nature of the case . . ." See also Hurtado v.
California, 110 U. S. 516, 529, 4 Sup. Ct. 111 (1884); Holden v. Hardy, 169 U. S.
366, 385, 18 Sup. Ct. 383 (1898); Twining v. New Jersey, 211 U. S. 78, 101, 29
Sup. Ct. 14 (1908). By providing an appropriate form of proceeding Congress
may extend the power of the federal courts to any class of cases involving a con-
troversy between citizens of different states. Railway Co. v. Whitten, 13 Wall.
270 (U. S. 1871); Gaines v. Fuentes, 92 U. S. 10 (1875). Clearly this would
cover the proceeding for a declaratory judgment.
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actions-as, for example, two of those cited by the Supreme Court,120
which involved the repudiated construction of the English act of 1852,
declining to decide upon rights to arise in the future, involving parties
unknown and not before the court-are not maintainable, that can
hardly mean that no declaratory action is maintainable. Because an in-
junction is refused in certain cases, it does not follow that no action for
an injunction is constitutional. Surely we are not permanently re-
stricted to the forms of procedure known in England in 1787.127 Is
there any evidence that it was intended to exclude a procedure known as
declarator in Scotland for 300 years? The fact is that actions resulting
in declaratory judgments have been known to the English and American
courts of equity for centuries, and that the proposed federal act, like
those in the states, merely extends this form of procedure to new situa-
tions. No new procedure is involved; merely the extension of an old
procedure to new facts.
Equity jurisdiction has been defined as "the power residing in such
court to determine judicially a given action, controversy, or question
presented to it for decision." Can it be said that a court having the
power to render declaratory judgments could not have conclusively de-
cided whether the landlords in the Auditorium case were, under the
lease, under a duty to give their consent, or whether they were privi-
leged to withhold it?128 Justice Brandeis concedes that a final judgment
could have been given. Determination of that question would have
settled the issue between the parties. "Cases" and "controversies"
'The court, instead of citing any of the American cases or the English de-
claratory judgment cases arising under the Rules of 1883, cites one American case
not involving a declaratory judgment and three English cases arising under the re-
pudiated construction of the Chancery Procedure Act of 1852, sec. 50, reading:
"No suit . . . shall be open to objection on the ground that a merely declaratory
decree or order is sought thereby, and it shall be lawful for the Court to make
binding declarations of right without granting consequential relief." The four
citations which Justice Brandeis introduces by the word "compare" are Cross v.
De Valle, 1 Wall. 1, 14 (U. S. 1863); Jackson v. Turnley, 1 Drew. 617, 627
(1853) ; Rooke v. Lord Kensington, 2 K. & J. 753, 760 (1856) ; Lady Langdale v.
Briggs, 8 De G. M. & G. 391, 427 (1856). Just what relation these cases bear to
Willing v. Chicago Auditorium Association, it is difficult for the writer to fathom.
Two of them dealt with future rights dependent on an uncertain contingency, issues
which courts commonly refuse to decide. (Cross v. De Valle; Lady Langdale v.
Briggs.) Judicial construction narrowed the Act of 1852 so that a declaration was
given only when the plaintiff could have sought consequential relief, which lie chose
not to request. (Jackson v. Turnley; Rooke v. Lord Kensington.) Thus a nega-
tive declaration that plaintiff was not bound to the defendant or that the defendant
had no just claim against him could not be granted (Jackson v. Turnley). This
narrow construction was changed by the Rules of 1883, so that the English cases
cited, except as to contingent or future rights, which are inapplicable, have been
repudiated. See Borchard, The Declaratory Judgment (1918) 28 YALE L. J. 1, at
26, 27.
' Supra notes 124 and 125.
"Borchard, The Declaratory Judgment (1918) 28 YALE L. J. 105, at 130;
Note (1929) 38 YALE L. J. 241.
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would seem intentionally to have been left broad terms, enabling Con-
gress to define the controversies over which the lower federal courts
might exercise jurisdiction, and the manner in which this was to be
done.129  Congress has been held the proper body to determine the
forms of proceeding in the federal courts. 30 If an issue is submitted
to the court "by a party who asserts his rights in the form prescribed
by law," 131 it would seem that the judicial power "is capable of acting"
upon the issue and deciding it.
In this connection, it is proper to remark that the Supreme Court
on three separate occasions uttered dicta to the effect that a person born
in the United States of foreign parents was not a citizen of the United
States, 132 and lawyers so advised their clients; yet, when the question
was squarely presented to the Supreme Court in Wbng Kim Ark v.
United States,'33 they reached a different conclusion. It may be hoped
and believed that when the declaratory action, as a form of procedure,
is squarely presented to the Supreme Court for decision-if and when
the federal bill is passed-that the court will examine the subject with
the thoroughness it customarily gives to constitutional issues and reach
the conclusion arrived at in England and elsewhere-that the declaratory
action involves a mere matter of practice and procedure, and that it in
no way enlarges the jurisdiction of the federal courts under the Con-
stitution.
In Piedmont & Northern Railway v. United States,3 4 the Supreme
Court again took occasion to mention the declaratory judgment. In
remarking that such a remedy was "not within either the statutory or
the equity jurisdiction of federal courts," they came closer to a sustain-
able conclusion than in the three cases discussed above. Constitutionality is
left unmentioned. It is true that no federal statute has yet been passed,
but as already observed-regardless of the correctness of the decision
in the Piedmofit case-courts of equity have for centuries rendered de-
claratory judgments. In the Piedmont case an electric railway company
was about to build an extension of its lines. The Interstate Commerce
Commission, learning of this proposal, notified the company that it was
" Stevenson v. Fain, 195 U. S. 165, 25 Sup. Ct. 6 (1904).
'Livingston v. Story, 9 Pet. 632 (U. S. 1835) ; Ex parte New Orleans City
Bank, 3 How. 292 (U. S. 1845).
'3' Marshall, C. J., in Osborn v. United States Bank, 9 Wheat. 738 (U. S.
1824) ; also Cherokee Nation v. Georgia, 5 Pet. 1, 75 (U. S. 1831).
Slaughter House Cases, 16 Wall. 36, 73 (1872) ; Minor v. Happersett, 21
Wall. 162, 167 (1874); Elk v. Wilkins, 112 U. S. 94, 102, 5 Sup. Ct. 41 (1884).
MILLER, LEcrumas ON THE CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES (1891) 279.
1 169 U. S. 649, 18 Sup. Ct. 456 (1898). In Washington v. W. C. Dawson &
Co., 264 U. S. 219, 238, n. 21, 44 Sup. Ct. 302 (1924), Justice Brandeis lists a series
of cases in which the Supreme Court has overruled earlier decisions.
'280 U. S. 469, 477, 50 Sup. Ct. 192 (1930).
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expected, as an interstate railroad under paragraph 18, section 1, of the
Act, to apply for a certificate of public necessity and convenience; other-
wise, if it proceeded withoui a certificate, it might be subject to severe'
penalties. The company thereupon made the application, while denying
the Commission's jurisdiction, claiming that it was an interurban rail-
way under paragraph 22 and, hence, exempt from the requirement of
the certificate. The Commission assumed jurisdiction and denied the ap-
plication on the merits. The company then brought suit to set aside
the order, and the Supreme Court, reversing the District Court,180 held
that, if the Commission had jurisdiction under paragraph 18, its order,
negative in substance and form, denied no right of the railway and was
not subject to judicial review; whereas, if the Commission had no
jurisdiction, under paragraph 22, its order was nugatory and hence
unreviewable. The court states that the company's complaint is not
correctly directed against the Commission's order, but is really directed
against the statute, seeking a determination that the company is an in-
terurban railway and hence covered by the exemption from certificate
provided by paragraph 22, and not an interstate railroad, subject to the
certificate under paragraph 18. This, the court suggests, is a declaratory
judgment, outside the statutory or equitable powers of the federal
courts.
While it may be true that the attack upon the Commission's order
was misconceived, the Piedmont Railway is in effect told that the only
way in which it can establish whether it is within or outside the exemp-
tion of paragraph 22 is to build the track without certificate and then,
in a defense to a criminal prosecution, assert its alleged immunity,
and, if in error, incur the penalties and other loss necessarily entailed.
Unless some third party brings an injunction against the company to
prevent an extension of track without a prior certificate' 80 or unless the
Commission proceeds against the company by an order to cease and
desist, the company can obtain no adjudication upon its right to build.
and is left in the awkward dilemma of having to risk a direct and ex-
pensive violation of a criminal statute in order to find out whether it was
or was not required to obtain a certificate. This no civilized legal system
should requireY.37 As social engineering, the non-justiciability of such
an issue, provided adversary parties can be found, is deplorable. In view
of the Commission's opposition to the company's proposal to build, there
seems no good reason why the company should not be afforded a judicial
- 30 F.(2d) 421 (W. D. S. C. 1929).
"3 Texas & Pacific Railvay v. Gulf, Colorado & Santa Fe Ry. Co., 270 U. S.
266, 272, 46 Sup. Ct. 263 (1926).
" This the Supreme Court seemed to appreciate in Terrace v. Thompson,
quoted supra note 122.
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opportunity to sue the Commission and require it as an announced ad-
versary in interest, to show cause why the company should not be
deemed immune from the requirement of a certificate. justiciability
should not depend upon whether the Commission or the company ini-
tiates the action.1 38  The case illustrates, like Willing v. Chicago Audi-
toriumn Association, the need for a procedure by action for a declaration,
enabling such aggrieved and endangered persons as the Piedmont Rail-
way to test and adjudicate concrete, challenged, and contested rights
without incurring as a condition precedent enormous risk and expense
and ultimate irreparable loss. The English and other legal systems have
long since made that discovery.
Just why the Supreme Court should have taken so hostile a view of
the declaratory judgment, it is difficult to surmise. With the certainty
that by virtue of that procedure, they are not required to render ad-
visory opinions or decide moot or non-justiciable disputes, the objection
must rest upon unmentioned fears. It has been suggested that they be-
lieved the federal courts might be overwhelmed with cases. The ex-
perience of state courts warrants no such fear. It has been said that
they object to the determination in this fashion of constitutional ques-
tions. But as every element of a justiciable controversy must be present,
it can make little difference whether the judgment sought, by which a
statute is "declared" valid or not, is supplemented by a coercive de-
cree of injunction or stands alone as a final adjudication of contested
rights.139  In the light of the decisions of some fourteen state courts,
embracing approximately seventy-five judges, which have expressly con-
cluded that the procedure meets every conceivable test of justiciability,
judicial power, and constitutionality, and of the decisions of twelve
state courts in which these conclusions were implied, it is believed to be
incumbent upon the Supreme Court to re-examine the question, should
opportunity present, in the light of the American cases and of the ex-
perience of the rest of the civilized world. To decide a constitutional
question before it is presented, to decide inferentially that a statute is
void before it is passed, is of doubtful propriety; and the conclusions
reached on the declaratory judgment, out of harmony with every other
court, exhibit the wisdom of the court's supposedly established rule
1" Fidelity National Bank & Trust Co. v. Swope, 274 U. S. 123, 131, 134, 47
Sup. Ct. 511 (1927). Said Stone, J.: "[The issues] cannot be any the less [a
case or controversy] because through a modified procedure the parties are reversed
and the same issues are raised and finally determined at the behest of the city."
.. In Williams v. Riley, 280 U. S. 78, 79, 50 Sup. Ct. 63 (1929), the court, by
McReynolds, J., says: "The prayer is for a decree declaring [the statutes'] in-
validity, and for an injunction restraining defendant from attempting to enforce
them." See also the cases cited supra notes 69 and 106.
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that it will not pass upon a constitutional question until it becomes es-
sential to the decision of a case.140
Justiciability
Perhaps a brief analysis of the concept of justiciability will not be
amiss. It is that which the term "case" or "controversy" is designed to
insure, and the Supreme Court has had frequent occasion to consider
the matter. 4' So have the courts of foreign countries.142  What then
"o Burton v. United States, 196 U. S. 283, 295, 25 Sup. Ct. 243 (1905) ; Light
v. United States, 220 U. S. 523, 538, 31 Sup. Ct. 485 (1911) ; Blair v. United States,
250 U. S. 273, 279, 39 Sup. Ct. 468 (1919). Nor will the court decide important
constitutional questions unnecessarily or hypothetically. Liverpool. N. J. & Phila.
S. S. Co. v. Commissioners, 113 U. S. 33, 39, 5 Sup. Ct. 352 (1885) ; Siler v. L. &
N. R. R., 213 U. S. 175, 191, 193, 29 Sup. Ct. 451 (1909) ; United States v. Dela-
ware & Hudson Co., 213 U. S. 366, 407, 29 Sup. Ct. 527 (1909); Cincinnati v.
Vester, 281 U. S. 439, 50 Sup. Ct. 360 (1930).
1 See Chisholm v. Georgia, 2 Dall. 431 (1793) ; Osborn v. United States Bank,
9 Wheat. 738 (U. S. 1824) ; California v. San Pablo & T. R. Co., 149 U. S. 308, 13
Sup. Ct. 876 (1893); Massachusetts v. Mellon, 262 U. S. 447, 43 Sup. Ct. 597
(1923) ; New Jersey v. Sargent, 269 U. S. 328, 46 Sup. Ct. 122 (1926) ; Old Colony
Trust Co. v. Commissioner of Internal Revenue, 279 U. S. 716, 49 Sup. Ct. 499
(1929), and other cases cited supra.
In the following jurisdictions, constitution or statute confers on the federal
courts jurisdiction to decide "cases" or "controversies" or "matters." They are
interpreted generally, except as noted below, as contemplating a justiciable issue.
In Australia, the word "matters," substituted in 1891 for "cases" and "contro-
versies," was intentionally made wide enough to include every kind of case which
could arise for judicial determination, as distinct from advisory opinion. See Arts.
75, 76 of Commonwealth Constitution, 1909. KERR, LAw OF THE AUSTRALIAN CON-
STITUTION (Melbourne, 1925) 238; MooRE, CONSTITUTION (Melbourne 1910) 208;
QUICK & CARRAN, ANNOTATED CONSTITUTION OF THE AUSTRALIAN COMMON-
wEALTTH (Melbourne, 1901) 767-8. Dominion of Canada v. Province of Ontario,
[1910] A. C. 637, 645; State of South Australia v. State of Victoria, 12 C. L. R.
667, 675, 708 (Australia, 1911) ; In re Judiciary Acts 1903-1920'and the Navigation
Acts 1912-1920, 29 C. L. R. 257, 265, 272 (Australia, 1921). In Canada, the
original jurisdiction of the Supreme Court may include the rendering of advisory
opinions. Attorney-General for British Columbia v. Attorney-General for Domin-
ion of Canada, [1914] A. C. 153, 162; Art. 101 of Brit. North America Act, 1867;
In re Reference by Governor-General in Council, 43 Can. L. R. 536, 563 (1910) ;
In re Roberts, [1923] Can. L. R. 152. The appellate jurisdiction of the Canadian
Supreme Court, by the term "judicial proceeding," seems to be limited to "any ac-
tion, cause, matter or other proceeding in disposing of which the court appealed
from has not exercised merely a regulative, administrative or executive jurisdic-
tion," i.e., a justiciable controversy, or "matter in controversy." SUIPREM COURT
ACT, sec. 2(e), REv. STAT. 1927, I, 639. The earlier statute permitted appeal upon
"a judgment . . . in any action, suit, case, matter or judicial proceeding, in the
nature of a suit or proceeding in equity." REv. STAT. 1887, II, 1761. Svensson v.
Bateman, 42 Can. L. R. 146, 154 (1909) ; Bateman v. Scott, 53 Can. L. R. 145, 149
(1916). In South Africa, original jurisdiction is given to the Supreme Court "in
all matters" in which the Union is a party or in which provincial legislation is
challenged. South Africa Act of 1909, sec. 98(3). Appellate jurisdiction is
granted over "judgments" (sec. 103). The Supreme Court Act of New Zealand,
1883, sec. 2, contains definitions of "cause," "action," and "matter" analogous to
those in the corresponding Canadian statute.
In the Argentine, the Supreme Court has jurisdiction over a caso J .dicial only,
i.e., a litigated issue in an actual controversy, and not over abstract questions. It
is pointed out that only in a concrete litigation can courts pronounce judgments.
Constitution, Art. 100, Art. 67 (closely analogous to United States Constitution,
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are the "necessary features" of justiciability ?14 3 While state courts oc-
casionally assume legislative and executive functions which could not
be imposed on federal courts, the power to determine contested rights is
a traditional function of all judicial courts in the western world.144
Expediency and the relative danger of conflict with other departments
of the government have induced a refusal to decide major political
questions14 5 or review mere administrative findings.146 Expediency and
a desire not to function in the abstract, but to decide only concrete con-
tested issues conclusively affecting adversary parties in interest, have
induced a refusal to render advisory opinions or decide moot cases. Ac-
tions or opinions are denominated "advisory," when there is an insuffi-
cient interest in the plaintiff or defendant to justify judicial determina-
tion, where the judgment sought would not constitute specific relief to
a litigant or affect legal relations or where, by reason of inadequacy of
Art. III, sec. 2); BAS, EL DERECHO FEDERAL ARGENTINO (B. A., 1927) I, 340; in
JURISPRUDENCrA ARGENTINA, edited by T. Jofr6 and L. Anastasi, see following
cases: Urlicie, 1919, 3:1080; Saenz Valientz v. Provincia de Correntes, 1921, 7:80;
Cordero v. Barnetache, 1921, 7:159. See also COLINA, DERECHO Y LEGISLAcI6N
PROCESAL (B. A., 2d ed. 1916) I, 299; GONZALES CALDER6N, DEREC-HO CONSTrITU-
CIONAL ARGENTINO (B. A., 1923) I, 437; RODRIGUEZ, COMENTARIO AL CODIGO DE
PROCEDIMIENTO (Barcelona, 2d ed. 1914) I, 114.
In Brazil, where federal jurisdiction is analogous to that in the United States,
the constitution speaks of causas e conflictos (cases and controversies) and litigios
and reclamaoes (litigations and claims). It appears that judgment cannot be pro-
nounced except in litigated cases involving genuine controversies between parties
having a justiciable interest in a decision. Constitution Arts. 59, 60. LESSA, EL
PODER JUDICIARIO (Rio de Janeiro, 1915) 1, 52; MAXIMILIAN, COMENTARIOS A
CONsTITUCAO BRASLEnA (Rio, 1918) 586; MILTON, A CONSTITUO DO BRAZIL(Rio, 1898)2 287, 300. In Colombia, the same view is taken of the words,
causa, pleito, jicia (of equivalent meaning, Judicial Code, secs. 254, 255) and of
c tgio, altercado, disputa, controversia. CODIGO JUDIcIAl (Bogota, 5th ed. 1917).
GARATO, JURISPRUDENCIA D I.05 TRIBNALES (Bogota, 1908) No. 1199, 3233;
GARAVITO, JURISPRUDENCIA DE LA CORTE SUPREMA, 1914-19 (Bogota, 1921) No.
2139 (Sentencia 30 Oct., 1924). The same view prevails in Peru, ROMmRo, ESTUDIOS
DE LE(ISLAC 6N PROCESAL (Lima, 1914) II, 6, 11-13; SAMANAMU, PRONTUARIO DE
PROCEDIMENTS CIVILES (Lima, 1917) 9, 1, and in other South American coun-tries. SA ANAMU, op. cit., at 9, n. 2. For genezuela, see Coi o DR PROcEDIMNTOCnnvi 1916 (Caracas, ed. oficial 1917) §§ 11, 14, 234, 235.Old Colony Trust Co. v. Commissioner of Internal Revenue, 279 U. 5. 716,49 Sup. Ct. 499 (1929), in which the court held, by Taft, C. J., that an appeal from
the Federal Tax Board sustaining certain assessments on a taxpayer, was judicially
reviewable.
'" Under the doctrine of separation of powers, it is universally admitted that
the decision of actual controversies involving legal rights is a function of thejudiciary, and not of any other department. In re Kariher's Petition, 284 Pa. 455,
131 Atl. 265 (1925). On judicial power, see also Carpenter, Separation of Posvers
in the Eighteenth Century (1928) 22 Am. POL. Sci. REV. 32; Finkelstein, Judicial
Self-Limitation (1924) 37 HARV. L. Rv. 338; Sunderland, The Scope of Judicial
Review, (1929) 27 MIcH. L. REv. 416.
' Supra note 83.
... Supra note 77. The Supreme Court is careful to ascertain which orders
are findings of fact or unreviewable. United States v. Los Angeles, & S. L. R.,
273 U. S. 299, 313, 47 Sup. Ct. 413 (1927) ; Piedmont & Northern Ry. v. United
States, 280 U. S. 469, 50 Sup. Ct. 192 (1930). Pillsbury, Administrative Tribunals(1923) 36 HARv. L. REV. 405, 583.
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parties defendant, the judgment could not be sufficiently conclusive.14 7
Actions or opinions are described as "moot" when they are or have be-
come fictitious, colorable, hypothetical, academic, or dead.148 The dis-
tinguishing characteristic of such issues is that they involve no actual,
genuine, live controversy, the decision of which can definitely affect ex-
isting legal relations. The issue is either not yet ripe for determina-
tion, because no opposing claim or right has yet been asserted or ad-
vanced or has arisen and hence no actual or potential conflict can be es-
tablished, or else the issue has ceased to be live or practical, because the
facts have changed, either by settlement of the controversy or by alter-
ation in the circumstances of the parties or subject-matter, so as to
make the judgment not decisive or controlling of actual and contested
rights, but a pronouncement having academic interest only. Such issues
cannot be determined by declaratory judgment any more than by another
judgment. "The fact that the plaintiff's desires are thwarted by its own
doubts, or by the fears of others"' 49 may or may not describe a hypo-
thetical or moot case, depending on the circumstances. In bills of peace,
quia tintet, to quiet title, of interpleader, and other equitable proceedings,
in actions to declare transactions (such as marriages) or instruments
(such as bonds or deeds or titles) or privileges and powers (such as
sale) valid or void, the plaintiff's action may be motivated by his own
doubts or the denial or fears of third parties as to his right or title, but
there is no justiciable issue until he translates his doubt into a claim of
right and asserts it against a defendant having an interest in contesting
it. When that happens, it is a justiciable controversy, regardless of its
origin in the plaintiff's own doubts or the fears of others, 15° and regard-
less of the form of action, declaratory or executory, in which the issue
is presented. The question is, whether the plaintiff has a sufficient in-
" Gordon v. United States, 117 U. S. 697 (1864) ; Garden City News v. Hurst,
129 Kan. 365, 282 Pac. 720 (1929) ; Axton v. Goodman, 205 Ky. 382, 265 S. W. 806(1924) ; Kelly v. Jackson, 206 Ky. 815, 268 S. W. 539 (1925); Dietz v. Zimmer,
231 Ky. 546, 21 S. W. (2d) 999 (1929).
""A moot case is one which seeks to get a judgment on a pretended contro-
versy, when in reality there is none, or a decision in advance about a right before it
has been actually asserted and contested, or a judgment upon some matter which,
when rendered, for any reason, cannot have any practical effect upon a then exist-
ing controversy." Ex parte Steele, 162 Fed. 694, 701 (N. D. Ala. 1908). See Lord
v. Veazie, 8 How. 251 (U. S. 1849) ; Bartemeyer v. Iowa, 18 Vall. 129 (U. S.
1873) ; Singer v. Wright, 141 U. S. 696, 12 Sup. Ct. 103 (1891) ; United States v.
Evans, 213 U. S. 297, 29 Sup. Ct. 507 (1909); Richardson v. McChesney, 218
U. S. 487, 31 Sup. Ct. 43 (1910) ; United States v. Hamburg-American Line, 239
U. S. 466, 36 Sup. Ct. 212 (1915).
""Willing v. Chicago Auditorium Ass'n, 277 U. S. 274, 289, 48 Sup. Ct. 507
(1928). Judge Brandeis thought such a fact "does not confer a cause of action";
but see cases cited supra note 119.
' Woodward v. Fox West Coast Theaters, 284 Pac. 350 (Ariz. 1930); Wash-
ington-Detroit Theater Co. v. Moore, 249 Mich. 673, 229 N. W. 618 (1930); Girard
Trust Co. v. Tremblay Motor Co., 291 Pa. 507, 140 Atl. 506 (1928).
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terest to warrant judicial protection, and whether the conditions essen-
tial to any judgment are present, namely, the competence or jurisdiction
of the court over parties and subject-matter, the capacity of the parties
to sue and be sued, the adoption of the usual forms for conducting
judicial proceedings, the existence of operative facts justifying the judi-
cial declaration of the legal consequences, the assertion against an in-
terested party of rights capable of judicial protection, and a sufficient
legal interest in the moving party to entitle him to invoke a judgment.
Although a decree of execution is not an-essential part of a judgment,
a court may decline to render judgment when it would be ineffective or
inoperative.1' 1 The declaratory judgment in a sense partakes of the
character of equitable decrees and in flexibility exceeds them, in that
the court has wide discretion in declining to give a declaration of rights
if it does not believe a useful purpose, in terminating the controversy,
will thereby be served.
The "necessary features" of justiciability which afford the greatest
difficulty in analysis are the requirements of "interested" parties assert-
ing "adverse" claims. When has the plaintiff a sufficient "interest" to
warrant judicial protection? When are claims "adverse"?
To be "interested," some legal relation of the plaintiff must be
capable of being affected by the decision; but besides that, the "interest"
must be "substantial." Courts differ in their views as to what is "sub-
stantial," a difference especially notable in actions by taxpayers de-
signed to determine the validity of public action under statute or admin-
istrative order. State courts, when they think the public issue important,
are disposed to find a taxpayer's interest, however trifling, as adequate
to sustain the justiciability of the action.' 52  Federal courts are more
inclined carefully to scrutinize the nature of the interest of the plaintiff
in the public issue presented, and to require that it be "substantial" to
the plaintiff personally.'53 The factors giving "s'bstance" to an interest
E.g., because the land affected is in another state. Braman v. Babcock, 98
Conn. 549, 120 Atl. 150 (1923) ; Westchester Mortgage Co. v. Grand Rapids R. R.,
246 N. Y. 194, 158 N. E. 70 (1927).
' See Ellingham v. Dye, 178 Ind. 336, 99 N. E. 1 (1912), where the taxpayer's
interest in the public action challenged was three cents; Zoercher v. Agler, 172
N. E. 186 (Ind. 1930). In Massachusetts v. Mellon, 262 U. S. 447, 486-7, 43 Sup.
Ct. 597 (1923), the Supreme Court, by Sutherland, J., admitted that "the interest
of a taxpayer of a municipality in the application of its moneys is direct and im-
mediate," warranting the use of the injunction, Crampton v. Zabriskie, 101 U. S.
601, 609 (1879), but held that, in relation to the federal government, the interest
of the taxpayer was "comparatively minute and indeterminable," justifying a denial
of an injunction to a taxpayer against the alleged improper expenditure of federal
funds.
" Stearns v. Woods, 236 U. S. 75, 35 Sup. Ct. 229 (1915) ; Massachusetts v.
Mellon, 262 U. S. 447, 43 Sup. Ct. 597 (1923) ; New Jersey v. Sargent, 269 U. S.
328, 46 Sup. Ct. 122 (1926); 'Williams v. Riley, 280 U. S. 78, 50 Sup. Ct. 63
(1929).
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appear to be the importance of the legal relation, the value of the prop-
erty, the immediacy of the interest to be affected by the decision. And
yet if is not easy to define these factors quantitatively. The interest must
be present, and not contingent, though it may be presently affected or
jeopardized by a future event certain to occur, such as the future en-
forcement of an existing statute 5 4 or the death of a life-tenant, in the
case of remaindermen or reversioners, or the future expiration of a
contract or lease, in the case of disputes as to the privilege of renewal,
or the privilege of exercising future powers or rights under written in-
struments, including contracts. 1 55
What is necessary to make a claim "adverse" is not too clearly in-
ferable from the precedents. "Controversy" is a broad term and has
been defined as a dispute, a litigated question, a lawsuit, a suit at law or
in equity, a civil action or proceeding, and is sometimes distinguished
from "case," which would include a criminal proceeding.'5 0 An "ad-
verse" claim is usually associated with hostility, though this is not neces-
sarily so. The mere fact that the defendant's interest is -potentially ad-
verse justifies summoning him to defend; and the mere fact that he ad-
mits his liability' 57 or consents to be sued'5 8 or even, under certain cir-
cumstances of so-called "friendly suits," that he is interested in the same
judgment as the plaintiff,15 9 is not necessarily a bar to an ordinary exec-
Village of Euclid v. Ambler Realty Co., 272 U. S. 365, 47 Sup. Ct. 114(1926), where the mere passage of a zoning statute was deemed deleteriously to
affect the value of plaintiff's land without proof of prospective use. Cf. West v.
City of Wichita, 118 Kan. 265, 234 Pac. 978 (1925), where proof of use was
deemed a condition precedent to justiciability of the validity of the ordinance. See
also Pierce v. Society of Sisters, "268 U. S. 510, 45 Sup. Ct. 571 (1925). In City
of Denver v. Denver Land Co., 85 Colo. 998, 274 Pac. 743 (1929), a judgment was
properly refused, because the city had not yet enacted a proposed ordinance creating
an improvement assessment district and because opposing parties in interest were
not present.
'Stueck v. G. C. Murphy Co., 107 Conn. 656, 142 Atl. 301 (1928) ; Miller v.
E. & M. Theater Corp., 134 Misc. 634, 235 N. Y. Supp. 595 (Sup. Ct. 1929);
Brokaw v. Fairchild, 135 Misc. 70, 237 N. Y. Supp. 6 (Sup. Ct. 1929) ; Post v.
Metropolitan Casualty Ins. Co., 227 App. Div. 156, 237 N. Y. Supp. 64 (4th Dept.
1929) ; Miller v. Miller, 149 Tenn. 463, 261 S. W. 965 (1924) ; Tennessee Eastern
Elec. Co. v. Hannah, 157 Tenn. 582, 12 S. W. (2d) 372 (1929).
" o Island v. Massachusetts, 12 Pet. 657, 723 (U. S. 1838) 1 C. 3. 940.
"Kentucky v. Indiana, 281 U. S. 163, 50 Sup. Ct. 275 (1930); Gavit in 30
CoLumBiA LAW RFv. 802, 810 (1930).
" Lord v. Veazie, 8 How. 251, 255 (U. S. 1849). The action is brought amica-
bly, though the issue is contested. Payette-Bois Water Users v. Fairchild, 35
Idaho 97, 205 Pac. 258 (1922) ; Aalfo Co. v. Kinney, 105 N. J. L. 345, 144 Ati.
715 (1929).
" Cotting v. Goddard, 183 U. S. 79, 22 Sup. Ct. 30 (1901) ; Kentucky v. In-
diana, 281 U. S. 163, 50 Sup. Ct. 275 (1930) ; Parker v. State, 132 Ind. 419, 31 N.
E. 1114 (1892). Indeed, the courts will be less prone under such circumstances to
grant declarations, which are not usually issued on admissions or consent.
"Friendly" creditors' suits in the reorganization of a business, if not a fraud on
other creditors [Coliseum v. Interstate Lumber Co., 123 Ala. 512, 26 S. W. 122(1898)], and actions by stockholders against their corporation to prevent a payment
of taxes are not uncommon.
CONSTITUTIONALITY OF JUDGMENTS
utory action. Rights are often asserted and denied for the purpose of
making a test case,160 and the agreed statement of facts or case stated' 01
is a common phenomenon. The court must merely be alert to distin-
guish the fictitious or collusive suit, where only information or opinion
is sought, from those in which rights are placed in issue with the pur-
pose of a binding determination. 16 2  In actions for a declaration, far
more evidence of conflicting interest is usually required than in some
of these cases. Just as in equitable actions to quiet title or quia timet,
no wrong need be proved, but merely the existence of a claim or record
which disturbs the title, peace, or freedom of the plaintiff, so any claims,
assertions, records, or adverse interests, which by casting doubt, inse-
curity, and uncertainty upon the plaintiff's rights or status, impair his
pecuniary or material interests, establish a condition of justiciability. 163
Equity has already demonstrated that wrong or threatened wrong is not
a condition of justiciability. Adverse interests endangering or disturb-'
ing vested rights mhay suffice to enable a person to invoke judicial relief.
While actions for declaratory judgments may be brought either after
wrong done or threatened, or prior thereto, the fact that the court must
be convinced that its judgment will settle the controversy and quiet the
disputed or endangered rights is an assurance against abuse of a remedy
which has admirably served a considerable part of the civilized world.
In the thousands of decided cases, we find every element of justiciability
in the most technical sense. Each case must stand on its own facts.
Should any case lack any of the "necessary features" of justiciability,
it will be dismissed; but a generalization that all actions for declaratory
judgments lack the "necessary elements" of justiciability is, in the light
of the record in England and elsewhere, an unsustainable conclusion. It
" Hylton's Case, 3 Dall. 171 (U. S. 1796) ; State v. Dolley, 82 KAN. 533, 537,
108 Pac. 846 (1910) ; 1 C. J. 974.
" Union & New Haven Trust Co. v. Watrous, 109 Conn. 268, 146 Ati. 727(1929) ; Burton v. Durham Realty & Ins. Co., 188 N. C. 473, 125 S. E. 3 (1924).
In Australia it is called a special case for the opinion of the court. HIGH COURT
RuLxs, Order xxxii, r. 1, sec. 1. This differs from the question certified by ajudicial or administrative tribunal for the opinion of a higher court. Federated
Engine-Drivers', etc., Ass'n v. Broken Hill Proprietary Co., 16 C. L. R. 245
(1912); Merchant Service Guild v. Newcastle Hunter River Steamship Co., 16
C. L. R. 591 (1913); Australian Commonwealth Shipping Board v. Federated
Seamen's Union, 36 C. L. R. 442 (1925).
"a Lord v. Veazie, 8 How. 251 (U. S. 1849) ; Bell & Howell Co. v. Bliss, 262
Fed. 131 (C. C. A. 7th, 1919) ; Smith v. Junction Ry. Co., 29 Ind. 546 (1868). The
distinction is not always simple. When courts wish to decide an issue, they are
likely to disregard the fact that it is a "made" case, as in Hylton's Case, 3 Dall.
171 (U. S. 1796), involving the federal tax on carriages, or that the ostensible
parties to the record may not be the real parties in interest or those mainly inter-
ested. I
"Guthery v. Ball, 206 Mo. App. 570, 228 S. W. 887 (1921) ; Reed v. Reed,
106 Misc. 85, 175 N. Y. Supp. 264 (Sup. Ct. 1919) ; Morecroft v. Taylor, 225 App.
Div. 562, 234 N. Y. Supp. 2 (1st Dept. 1929).
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may be hoped, therefore, that the United States Supreme Court will
soon modify its unfortunate dicta and join the rest of the world in con-
cluding that a proper action for a declaratory judgment presents every
"necessary feature" of justiciability and of a "case" or "controversy."
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